

CURRENT *History* A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

MARCH 1964

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FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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CURRENT History

MARCH, 1964

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Supplementing the December, 1963, issue of Current History on West Africa, in this issue seven specialists turn their attention to the nations of East Africa. Setting South Africa into this mosaic, this author writes, "... a country which might have been expected to play a leading role in the advance of the African continent . . . has instead become the bête noir of the rest of Africa and, to some extent, of the world at large."

South Africa and World Opinion

By MARY BENSON
Specialist on African Affairs

INTERNATIONAL CONCERN over the race policies of the South African Government and the white electorate has been evident since 1946. At that time, although only 14 of the 54 United Nations were Afro-Asian, the General Assembly voted by considerable majorities for the rejection of Prime Minister Smuts's proposal to incorporate the mandated territory of Southwest Africa into the Union. United Nations action was the result of uneasiness over South Africa's policy of race segregation, combined with many appeals from the non-whites in South and Southwest Africa, with the Indian government playing a leading role in the debates.

Over the years censure grew, stimulated after the Nationalist government had come to power in 1948 and hit its stride in passing racialistic laws. In 1952, the Defiance Cam-

paign, initiated by the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress in protest against several such laws, inspired the United Nations to establish a commission to examine the question of racial conflict in South Africa resulting from the policy of apartheid. Thereafter not only did critical resolutions proliferate but annual reports detailed the effects of that policy.¹ Then came the police shootings of anti-pass law² demonstrators at Sharpeville and Langa in March, 1960, which precipitated widespread shock. Denunciation of the policies that had provoked the tragedy came from, among others, the United States Department of State and the Parliament of Great Britain.

The impact of African opinion was increasingly felt after 1960 when a spate of new African members joined the United Nations. They maintained that denunciation without positive action aimed at a change in South Africa's policy, amounted to hypocrisy. And so in 1963 international condemnation cul-

¹ See Security Council S/5426 of September 16, 1963, for most recent report.

² Law requiring non-Europeans to carry identification cards (passes) at all times.

minated in a series of activist resolutions being brought up for consideration by the United Nations.

On August 7, the Security Council, and, on October 11, the General Assembly (by 106 votes to South Africa's one), solemnly called on the South African Government to liberate all those imprisoned or restricted "for having opposed the policy of apartheid."³ Meanwhile, considering South Africa's intransigence over Southwest Africa, the Assembly, by 84 votes to six, with 17 abstentions, urged member states not to supply petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa.

On December 4, the Security Council called on states to cease the sale and shipment to South Africa of equipment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition. It thus reinforced the Assembly's resolution of November 6, 1962, which requested states to help bring about the abandonment of South Africa's racial policies by various stringent measures—among them, refraining from exporting arms and ammunition to South Africa, breaking off diplomatic relations, closing ports to South African ships, and refusing landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. Many states have complied with all or part of this earlier resolution. The United States government, for one, placed an embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa. Britain, though voting for the Security Council resolution, insisted she would only ban arms used to further apartheid.

But the pressure of the African states has been felt not only in the United Nations (where apart from effectual economic sanctions, the question of the expulsion of South Africa is also lobbied). It is felt in numerous international organisations, for instance in the World Health Organisation and the International Olympics Committee. South Africa has been suspended from some such

organisations—among these are the International Labour Office and the Economic Commission for Africa. In addition, following the British Prime Minister's "Wind of Change" speech in Cape Town on February 3, 1960 (the first significant statement of British disapprobation of apartheid), the African and Asian Commonwealth states, along with Canada, insisted that the South African government abandon its racial policies if it wished to remain in the Commonwealth; whereupon South Africa withdrew.

Thus South Africa, a country which might have been expected to play a leading role in the advance of the African continent—with its great natural riches, its fascinating population of varied cultures who have in common a deep love for their country, and its wealth of industries—has instead become the *bête noir* of the rest of Africa and, to some extent, of the world at large. For although there are other countries where elementary human freedoms are denied, or where groups of people are racially prejudiced, only in South Africa, since Hitler, has a state been based on racialism.

Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister and leader of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, reacted to the Security Council's resolution of August 7 by stating:

We will never give in. If we weaken we are lost. . . . Here I stand. . . . Like Luther, we too say that we cannot do otherwise. Our conscience shows us the road—but so does our "selfishness." If we yield we throw away everything—our money, our goods, and our lives.

Suggesting that South Africa is the country where the whites of the world are destined to regain their inspiration, he added, "We are here to hold the fort so that they can regain their strength and start anew the battle for Christianity and civilization." On November 2, 1963, Verwoerd reiterated that the Nationalist party wants to keep South Africa white, and therefore its policy is "separate development."⁴ The majority of the whites in South Africa undoubtedly support these views.

Ironically, the Nationalists now find themselves beholden to their traditional enemy,

³ See Security Council Resolution S/5386. The Assembly resolution also called for the abandonment of the political trial of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and others.

⁴ See *Die Volksblad*, November 4, 1963. "Separate Development" became the new policy phrase when "apartheid" was discredited.

the British. The British Ambassador in South Africa encourages British investment there,⁵ and British delegates at the United Nations—though expressing “abhorrence” of apartheid—appeal to the Afro-Asian states to mollify their actions. Further, contrary to some opinion, there is evidence that the South African government is concerned about its isolated position, and that it is not likely to withdraw from the United Nations so rashly as it did from the Commonwealth. Mr. Eric Louw, retiring Foreign Minister, and notoriously tactless with Asian and African governments, has even stated that South Africa would continue attempts to restore diplomatic relations with independent African states.

AFRIKANER OPINION

In Afrikaner opinion two extremes emerge. There has been a pattern of non-conformity from a handful of Afrikaner intellectuals and theologians. Some who believed in the *ideal* of apartheid, with its implication of total apartness and whites doing their own labour, were disillusioned when confronted by the Government’s repudiation of the ideal.⁶

⁵ See *The Times*, London, September 12, 1963. Nearly \$3 billion of British capital is invested there. In 1963, Britain’s exports to South Africa were 46 per cent more than in 1962.

⁶ In 1950, Dr. D. F. Malan, Prime Minister, said, “. . . If one could attain total territorial apartheid, if it were practicable, everybody would admit it would be an ideal state of affairs . . . but that is not the policy of our party. . . . I clearly stated . . . that total territorial apartheid was impracticable under present circumstances in South Africa where our whole economic structure is to a large extent based on Native labour.” (Hansard No. 11, 4141–2). Quoted by Colin Legum; chapter on South Africa in *Africa: A Handbook to the Continent*, p. 382.

⁷ A Dutch Reformed Church which claims membership of 42 per cent of white South Africans and half a million Africans.

⁸ A leading member of the D.R.C., Dr. I. J. van der Walt, said the Christian Institute “comes indirectly into line with the Communist ideology”; that as a multi-racial community of Christ it is “directly in conflict with the idea of separate development.” *The Star*, Johannesburg, November 9, 1963.

⁹ As editor of a leading Nationalist newspaper he was described as making his newspaper “a tool of the Nazis.” Judgment of the Transvaal Supreme Court, July 13, 1943.

¹⁰ On October 1, 1963, police raided the newspaper’s offices, seizing documents relating to the Bond, allegedly stolen from its offices. Security Police questioned Dr. Naude and other liberal Afrikaners who had spoken frankly about the Bond.

Others have rebelled because they felt apartheid was un-Christian; for instance the senior theologian of the University of Stellenbosch, Professor B. B. Keet, said South African whites should “see colour prejudice for the irrational thing it is, for then we must condemn it as unethical and immoral . . . [and must] get rid of our arrogant feeling of superiority.” The most recent of these rebels was Dr. Beyers Naude, former Moderator of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk⁷ of the Southern Transvaal. Dr. Naude, representing the rethinking of a group of churchmen provoked by the Sharpeville tragedy, became director of a new multi-racial Christian Institute of South Africa. He was thereupon forced to resign his parish and was widely condemned by fellow-churchmen.⁸ Dr. Verwoerd accused “certain churchmen” of deviating from their original path in a way that might cause multi-racial ideas to spread into politics. Such deviation could be attributed to Communist conditioning.

In striking contrast to such small pockets of brave non-conformity is the *Broederbond* (band of brothers), the secret society which has considerable power in the Government and its agencies, such as the civil service and police, as well as in the Dutch Reformed Churches. General Hertzog, when he was Prime Minister in 1935, said it had become “a grave menace to the rest and peace of our social community, even where it operates in the economic-cultural sphere.” General Smuts believed it to be “a dangerous, cunning, political, Fascist, organization.” The fascist element among Nationalists is no less salient than during the 1939–1945 war when, amongst other leading Nationalists, Verwoerd strongly sympathised with the Nazis.⁹ In a series of articles, over the past few months, the *Johannesburg Sunday Times* has disclosed the continuing ominous power of the *Broederbond*.¹⁰

To conclude this brief survey of relevant Afrikaner opinion, it should be emphasized that Afrikaners—one eighth of the population of the Republic—dominate, wholly, the political life of the country. Further, the Nationalist government has so entrenched itself

by a series of questionable constitutional devices¹¹ that its defeat by constitutional means is improbable, if not impossible. At the last election, in 1961, the Nationalists won two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly, yet only polled 46 per cent of the votes cast.

ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPINION

As for the English-speaking whites, the majority of whom support the United Party, they share the resentment of the Nationalists of any outside criticism. This is the natural result of their having a common attitude on race questions and this resentment will harden as external pressure strengthens. The belief is still widespread among whites that such external criticism rests on "fundamental misconceptions and tragic ignorance," due to "the systematic dissemination of misleading and prejudiced information"—quotations not from the Government of 1963 but from that of 1936.

The United Party's leader, Sir de Villiers Graaff, told the Party congress recently that its policy of "race federation" would not satisfy world opinion as a whole: nothing would satisfy the Communists except a successful revolution and nothing would satisfy the extremist Afro-Asians except the introduction of one man, one vote, "and that we are not prepared to do." What the Party is prepared to do, he said, is to allow the 10 million Bantu¹² 14 white representatives in par-

Incidentally, the South African Foundation—founded in 1959 by influential industrialists, financiers and investors—desires to promote "international understanding of the South

African way of life, achievements and aspirations . . . the true picture of South Africa." It has effectively supplemented the public relations activities of the State Information Offices, despite its claim that it is non-political.

The only remotely democratic party in Parliament is the Progressive party, but it has only one Member in Parliament, and probably attracts the support of only about 100,000 whites.¹⁴ The Party's leader, Dr. Jan Steytler, went abroad briefly in November to convince Western statesmen that all white South Africans were not racialists. He felt that growing world pressure made it important to win support for his Party's policies, and while abroad explained its non-racialism, and its objective of a restricted franchise. He returned convinced that if South Africa were to adopt such a policy, all enmity would disappear, but that unless a political change were quickly brought about in South Africa, even the country's friends might lose sympathy, and "extreme measures" might be applied against her.

Two last factors should be mentioned. For more than 50 years respective Governments in South Africa have used the black bogey to unite the white electorate through fear, an essential weapon in preserving *baasskap* (white domination) and, implicit in this, in preserving the "aristocracy" of all whites. Secondly, South Africa's isolation because of her policies has ironically exacerbated the belief of many whites there that the world revolves around them. The Progressives are the least prone to this limitation, though not immune, when it comes to realizing that their country is but a small corner of the continent of Africa.

African and Indian leaders in South Africa, and radical whites (ranging in political opinion from militant Christians and liberals, to Communists) have long been in tune with the outside world. At first contacts were tentative, such as the African National Congress's appeals to British opinion soon after its foundation in 1912. The first association with the rest of Africa came in 1919 when Sol Plaatje, the writer, represented the A.N.C.¹⁵ at the Pan-African Congress in Paris.

¹¹ E.g., The Separate Representation of Voters Act 1951, and High Court of Parliament Act 1952, having been judged invalid, the Government reconstituted the Senate to give itself a two-thirds majority.

¹² The misnomer applied to Africans by the Nationalist government and Afrikaner academics. It means "the people."

¹³ See *South Africa*, London, November 29, 1963. Note: Sir de Villiers did not specify the representation for the 3.5 million whites but presumably it would be some 200 as at present.

¹⁴ A rough estimate based on the 1961 election in which Progressives and Liberals (who won no seats) together polled 71,503 votes.

¹⁵ The A.N.C. was then known as the Native National Congress.

But the momentous link came in 1946, when the President-General of the A.N.C., Dr. A. B. Xuma, took the Africans' case to the United Nations. The South African Indian Congress simultaneously was given the Indian government's valuable support in putting the broad case to the outside world. Thereafter regular reports on the worsening condition of non-whites were made. As already mentioned, 1952 was a milestone. In 1954, representatives of the non-whites attended the Bandung conference as observers. Another landmark came in January, 1960, when the boycott call of Chief Lutuli, President of the A.N.C., was taken up by the second All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunis. This boycott of South African products also won some support in Britain, where among its propagators were members of the South African Liberal Party. And early in 1960 the A.N.C. sent Lutuli's deputy, Mr. Oliver Tambo, abroad—the first roving “ambassador” to represent the Africans of South Africa. A leap forward in communication with the rest of the continent has followed, with both the A.N.C. and the Pan-Africanist Congress (which had led the anti-pass demonstrations at Sharpeville and elsewhere) in constant personal contact with representatives of the independent African states.

Radical opponents of apartheid might be imprisoned, outlawed, banned, or silenced in South Africa, but in the United Nations, London, the Scandinavian countries, and in African capitals, they are given a ready platform. Nelson Mandela, one of the leaders at present on trial for his life in South Africa, while underground had briefly left the country to visit heads of state throughout the continent and leaders of the Opposition in London, a tour that impressed all with the calibre of this member of the South African majority.

Alan Paton has pithily represented the attitude of the Liberal Party in welcoming the concern of the rest of Africa:

The Government, which looks upon itself as so practical, fulminates against Africans and African States as short-sighted, nasty-minded ranters, who are biting off their noses to spite their faces. What effect do such arguments have?—precisely nothing. Whatever may be the faults of Africans one thing is certain—they hate apartheid with all their hearts, and long only to destroy it. That is the cardinal fact. . . . That apartheid will come to an end, no sensible man can have a doubt. The Afrikaner Nationalist always believed that his passion was stronger than economics. The passion of liberated Africa will prove the same. . . .

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Since the grave economic setbacks resulting from world reaction to Sharpeville, the South African state has been able to retrieve “stability” through armed and police force,¹⁶ so that foreign investment, particularly from Britain and the United States, has again flowed in. The gold reserves have more than tripled to reach some \$744 million; exports are up and white immigration (after years of contraction under the Nationalist government) has steadily increased. Meanwhile more than one half million Africans are unemployed¹⁷ (about 14 per cent of the African labour force). In urban areas between 50 per cent and 80 per cent of African families live below the poverty datum line, and there are persistent and alarming reports of malnutrition in both urban areas and in native reserves. In other words, the industrial colour bar and the migrant labor system deprive non-whites of their rightful share in the prosperity of their country. Verwoerd's claim that incomes for Africans are higher in South Africa than in any other African country is irrelevant when Africans, who have helped to build up the wealth, not only are denied a fair share in it but are prevented by law from improving their lot.¹⁸

Apartheid as a policy, as has been pointed out, was rejected as “impracticable” by the South African government only two years after its inception. As it virtually became a

¹⁶ Expenditure on defence and police has risen in the period from some \$120 million to \$309 million. See Security Council Report S/5426 for details.

¹⁷ Report of the Froneman Committee to Parliament, January, 1963.

¹⁸ While white earnings rose by 35 per cent between 1946 and 1961, African earnings rose by 11 per cent: i.e., a white man gets approx. \$780 more than in 1946 to an African's approx. \$53 increase.

symbol of revulsion for the outside world, even the word itself has been dropped by the Government, and "separate development" substituted. The policy remains the same; as Colin Legum has pointed out,

it is not possible briefly to examine the scores of legislative measures taken by the Nationalist Government since 1948 to separate the races; to counter opposition to their measures; to curb their more radical white opponents; and to entrench their own position. There is hardly an aspect of social and economic life—from the home, the school and the Church to the trade union, the factory and the political party—which has not been legislated for.

LEGISLATION FOR APARTHEID

The fundamental object of this legislation is to ensure that in white areas the African will be kept in his place—namely, merely an object to labour for the white "aristocrats" with so little social security,¹⁹ so warped an education,²⁰ with no right to strike, no right to perform skilled labour,²¹ so harried by the pass laws,²² that he will humbly remain in that place.

Apart from the pass laws, probably the law that has caused most suffering to ordinary people is the Urban Areas Act (Section 10), under which menfolk are retained in urban areas as long as their labour is required, while their families may be "endorsed out"—in effect, exiled. Thousands of families have been broken up, and in the Cape this has led to violence on the part of men, forcibly deprived of wives and children, who have been sent to the distant reserves (renamed "Bantu areas"). The last vestige of security that the four million Africans in the urban areas have had is due to be removed by the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill coming before Parliament in 1964.

¹⁹ See Natives Urban Areas Act and successive amendments. Native Land Act, Native Administration Act, etc.

²⁰ See Bantu Education Act, The Extension (sic) of Universities Act.

²¹ See Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, Native Building Workers Act, etc.

²² From 1951 to 1960 more than 3.5 million Africans were convicted under these laws: Statement by Minister of Justice, February, 1962. For most this meant prison terms, as not many could afford the fines.

After eleven years of rule, the Nationalist government tabled its Bantu self-government policy. The four million Africans in the cities "will never become part of the White community," according to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Dr. M.D.C. de Wet Nel, when he explained this policy, and he added that the reserves would be their "Bantu homelands." What he did not say, and fundamental to overseas criticism, is that the African four-fifths of the Republic's population are thus confined to less than 13 per cent of the land, and that the Government's own blueprint for apartheid—the Tomlinson Report—had recommended that 49 per cent of the *existing* population in those "Bantu areas" will "have to be removed eventually from the agricultural land." What then becomes of the 9 million Africans left over?

The Tomlinson Commission estimated that \$312 million must be spent in the first ten years (its report was published in 1956), but the average spent during the subsequent seven years was less than \$12 million a year. A five year plan was announced in 1963 to cost \$171 million but two-thirds of this is to house the surplus population moved from the agricultural land. Even the comparatively high budgetary provision for Bantu areas in 1963–1964 is only \$27 million—2 per cent of the budget compared with 16 per cent on defence.

After 15 years of Nationalist rule, the first Bantustan—the Transkei—has been established, in fulfillment of the Government's policy of "self-government" for the Bantu. Though the support of the Government's racial policies is assured with the majority of seats (64) being assigned to hereditary chiefs (who are paid by the Government and can be dismissed by it), and though all of the limited powers of the Transkei Parliament are subject to the assent of the Republic's President, the election was seen as a setback for apartheid and a rebuff for Dr. Verwoerd when the majority of elected seats (45) was won by Chief Poto, a proponent of multi-racialism. It will be interesting to follow the fortunes of the Transkei.

Brief reference should be made to another

factor that has recently aroused interest in Britain and America, the mooted in South Africa of "partition." The supposition is that white South Africa, between a black continent to the north and a black belt to the southeast, will retain the gold, copper, uranium and diamond mines of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, with most of the Cape as its outlet to the sea, while to the Bantu areas the British Protectorates will be added, as well as part of Natal, for the Africans. Dr. Verwoerd has roundly rejected the idea, while Sir de Villiers Graaff commented, "It leaves little old white South Africa neatly snuffed out as a candle under a tea-cosy." He pointed out that Africans were hardly likely to accept such an economic division and that it would not be "partition or death," but "partition and death."

VOICES OF PROTEST

Segregation, apartheid, separate development, all, for Africans and other non-whites, have meant one thing, oppression. For more than 50 years Africans have made their patient protests. In 1909, African leaders, opposing the Act of Union which would give massive power to the privileged white minority, declared their aim to be a South Africa wherein all people, regardless of class, colour or creed, would be entitled to full and equal rights. Gandhi led the South African Indians in their attempts to break down segregation and unjust laws. The A.N.C. led passive resistance against the pass laws and sent innumerable deputations to the Government. Meanwhile every avenue of protest was being closed by law after law. The P.A.C. demonstrators were shot down in 1960 but this was only one of a series of such incidents. Yet only in 1961 did African leaders finally reach the conclusion that the violence of the state could only be countered by violence, and since then more than 200 acts of sabotage have been committed—with the intent to harm humans as little as possible.

The Government extended its already massive powers by further legislation. The law that has most outraged informed opinion has been the General Law Amendment Act of

1962 and 1963. To mention only part of its clauses: it removes the right of habeas corpus, imposes severe penalties, including the death penalty, on any tampering with the "maintenance of law and order" or with any private or public property. It includes among punishable offences the aim of "bringing about any social or economic change in the Republic." It shifts the onus of proof onto the accused. All over South Africa mass trials are being held under this Act, and under the Unlawful Organisation Act of 1960 (which outlawed the A.N.C., P.A.C. and other organisations). By November, 1963, 40 Africans had been sentenced to death and six to life imprisonment for sabotage, and 650 (including other races) sentenced to imprisonment for terms of between one and 25 years. Hundreds more are awaiting trial. Furthermore, under the "90-day" clause of the General Law Amendment Act, which gives wide powers of arrest without charge or trial, more than 500 people of all races have been detained for that period, a few for three consecutive periods of 90 days, most of them held in solitary confinement, without access to lawyers, and under prolonged interrogation. Evidence of torture of some African detainees at the hands of police has caused widespread disquiet, and Hamilton Russell, former United Party M.P., as well as many of the English language newspapers in South Africa, the *London Observer* and other British newspapers, have reported the cases and made substantial protests.

The rage felt by independent African states at the ever-intensifying oppression of

(Continued on page 179)

Mary Benson, now a contributor to the *London Observer*, *The Times*, *The Guardian* and the B.B.C., was born and educated in South Africa. In 1963, she lectured at universities in California and Massachusetts on the African leaders in South Africa. She is author of *Tshekedi Khama*, *The African Patriots* and *Chief Albert Lutuli* and was a contributor to *I Will Still Be Moved* and *Africa: A Handbook to the Continent*.

"Tanganyika is poor even in an African context," notes this specialist, who believes that "the extent of its underdevelopment is the most important fact to be grasped. . . . the backcloth against which all political happenings have to be studied."

Tanganyika's Two Years of Independence

By LIONEL CLIFFE

Tutor in Political Science, Kivukoni College, Tanganyika

PRESIDENT Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika recalled in his message to Kenya on her independence that, "When many of us who now have positions of responsibility in East Africa were still children, the people of Kenya had begun a struggle for justice and dignity." Organised politics started 40 years ago in Kenya. Tanganyika seemed to be slumbering ten years ago, when Uganda was seething after the deportation of the Kabaka of Buganda, and Kenya had boiled over and a state of emergency existed. Yet today, Tanganyikans are the "elder statesmen" of East Africa.

This has been partly due to Tanganyika's good fortune. Her status as a Trusteeship Territory enabled her leaders to appeal over the heads of the British Colonial Government to the United Nations. Historical and geographical accident meant that there was no single tribe in Tanganyika in a position to dominate national politics, and thus create a reaction among the others.

However, Tanganyika's success in moving from its first elections in 1958 to independence in three years cannot be dismissed solely as a matter of chance. The policy and tactics of the one national political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (Tanu), and its leader, Julius Nyerere, were decisive. The success of the party in mobilising the whole nation, coupled with Nyerere's moderation and non-racialism, were answer enough to all the excuses or hesitations which the colonial government might have had. Tanganyika

came to independence with a well organised national movement, uniting all the tribes; a multi-racial community with a total absence of racial strife; and a leader enjoying enormous loyalty and at the same time held in high regard by the outside world. At least this was the world's image of Tanganyika. Much of the disillusionment with subsequent events resulted from the fact that this was too rosy a picture.

On the other side of this balance sheet must be placed the lack of economic and social development. Despite some improvement of African agriculture and small-scale manufacturing, particularly during the 1950's, the per capita national income remained little more than \$50 a year. While some peasant farmers (those around Mount Kilimanjaro and the shores of Lake Victoria, for instance) had prospered, most of the rural population was concerned mainly with subsistence farming. Indeed, on Independence Day, almost half a million people in the barren Central Region, where famine is endemic, were being kept alive on free issues of United States surplus corn.

Naturally, the same backwardness was to be found in social services. Even today, only half the children get any kind of schooling; and it was estimated that there were only 60 African college graduates to take the country into independence. There were less than 400 miles of hard road in a country almost half again as big as Texas. In 1960, 550 doctors were trying to care for 10 million

people. The situation has probably deteriorated as expatriate medical officers have left government service.

Tanganyika was not in the fortunate position of a country like Ghana which had large accumulated reserves to finance development. Neither was Tanganyika receiving British government subsidies to make up her budget, as was Kenya. In fact, the Tanganyika government's annual expenditure on all items amounts to what the city of New York would spend on street cleaning during a bad winter.

Put simply, then, Tanganyika is poor even in an African context. The extent of its underdevelopment is the most important single fact to be grasped. It is the backcloth against which all political events must be studied. Government leaders clearly recognise that their first duty is to make some significant impact on the economy. This is contained in some reference to "the three enemies—poverty, ignorance and disease," and that Tanu's slogan since before Independence has been "*Uhuru na Kazi*"—freedom and work.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Faced with these problems it would be too much to expect any radical improvement in two brief years. However, there has been a six per cent increase in production in the non-agricultural sector of the economy. There has been no noticeable fall-off in business confidence, and consequently of building and trade, either at the prospect of, or the actual take-over, of the new regime. Neither were visitors frightened by the changing political climate; indeed, the boost to the East African economies from tourism is increasing by 15 per cent a year.

Tanganyika has neither a large enough market nor abundant enough raw materials to sustain any heavy industry, even though there is iron ore and coal in the southwest, and an East African common market of 25 million people. The emphasis, consequently, is on manufacturing of the country's own raw

materials (cashews, cotton, sugar and so on), and manufacturing to substitute for current imports. Two of the largest enterprises being planned in the latter category are an oil refinery and a cement factory, both near Dar es Salaam, the capital. Unfortunately, however, neither of these new industries will represent much of a net increase in production for East Africa as a whole, for both will compete with plants in Kenya, already operating under full capacity.

These are just two examples of a more general problem. As Kenya, the most industrially developed part of East Africa, supplies one-third of Tanganyika's imports, the choice before Tanganyika is to remain relatively undeveloped or to start industries which compete with others in Kenya. The latter alternative can probably be effective only behind purely national tariff walls. So the alternatives boil down to a collapse of the present economic union or the establishment of an East African Planning Authority, presumably under a federal government.

Despite the government's commitment to *Ujamaa*—Nyerere's Swahili translation of African socialism—many of these new undertakings will be in the hands of foreign, private business. Furthermore, legislation was passed in October, 1963, to guarantee the protection of certain foreign investments. This is not surprising because *Ujamaa* envisages a mixed economy and, in some cases there has been partnership between public and private enterprise. In practice, anyway, government has to supply the initiative, for there is little private initiative. The blueprint which the government is following is a recent feasibility study by an American firm.¹

Nyerere's brand of socialism seems to put greater emphasis on the avoidance of class divisions than on public ownership. He prefers to encourage private foreign investment rather than to see an indigenous capitalist class emerge. This can be seen in the field of trade. The Consumers' Supply Association of Tanganyika (C.O.S.A.T.A.) is being pushed faster by government than it would develop spontaneously. It is something of a state-owned distributive agency, run on

¹ *Tanganyika-Industrial Development: A preliminary study of bases for the expansion of industrial processing activities*, by Arthur D. Little Inc.

profit-sharing lines, in practice, rather than the consumers' cooperative it is supposed to be. It is obviously designed to whittle away the position of the existing traders—most of whom are Asian.

One of the government's most significant actions was legislation passed at the end of 1962 limiting the freedom of operation of labor unions. One act virtually outlawed all strikes, while another gave government some element of control over union affairs, particularly finances. The main consideration seems to have been the Tanganyikan government's desire not to allow irresponsible industrial action to interfere with the development of the economy. As a result of this legislation, the leader of the sisal plantation workers was "rusticated" in January, 1963, for three months. This episode, together with the two new laws, represents the government's successful containment of the only significant pressure group in the country—the unions.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Marketing cooperatives have played a major role in the Tanganyika economy for 30 years and have been the vehicle for the development of those areas where African peasant farming has prospered. One-third of the country's exports are now handled by co-operatives. There have been great efforts to extend their operation to other fields; in fact, the government hopes that they will shortly be handling all cash crops. At the moment, however, the government is sometimes carried away by its own enthusiasm for cooperatives *per se* and the farmer sometimes gets a lower price for his crop because of top-heavy administration and other inefficiencies. Further difficulties have been caused by the continuous change in the terms of trade *vis à vis* Tanganyika and restrictive quotas on important exports like coffee.

Another strand in the government's policy for improving the lot of the farmer is the development of transport in this vast, sprawling territory, of which little more than 10 per cent is occupied. New roads have been built and improvements made to existing ones previously impassable for six months of the

year during the rains. A new rail link connecting the Central Line and Dar es Salaam with the north of the country and, hence, with Kenya and Uganda, has been in operation for six months. Great emphasis has, rightly, also been placed on the building of "feeder roads" to connect the villages and isolated farmsteads with the main transport arteries. Thousands of miles of these simple dirt roads have been constructed by voluntary effort—"nation-building" schemes, as they are called.

This hardly amounts to an agrarian revolution, however. In late 1962, the President announced a new policy of "villagisation" for the transformation of the rural areas, to give the peasant something to show for his *Uhuru* (Independence). The aim was to bring farmers together into grouped settlements so that they could be provided with services—water, shops, a clinic, a school and the teaching of better farming methods—that it would be impossible to provide for the traditional scattered hamlets and homesteads. The first pilot village settlements are just getting under way, and must stand a fair chance of success. But it is too early to say much except that they involve so much money per individual that they cannot in themselves be regarded as a basic policy for the country's agriculture.

Education has received top priority in the nearly-ended three-year development plan. The government has preferred to see a 100 per cent increase in secondary, and similar improvements in higher, education, rather than developing primary education, in order to provide the trained people to run the country, to man that quarter of senior civil service posts left vacant by retired expatriates, and to man the new posts created by development. Only thus, too, can teachers be found to man the primary schools of the future. To lessen the burden on the central government, these have now been placed in the hands of newly-formed district and town councils.

Here again much of the new building is a result of "nation-building" efforts. This modern version of the traditional, communal carrying-out of tasks is in fact responsible for an impressive total of roads, schools and

teachers' houses, dispensaries, wells and other new social capital. Even more usefully, perhaps, this campaign has "made the people development-conscious" as one Minister put it recently. This has certainly been the aim of one of the agencies behind this work—the government's "Community Development" workers. Their role is not merely to build roads or clinics, to run mass literacy courses, or to dig wells, but through such means to educate the people to accept social change. They aim to counter the understandable reluctance of the rural populace to leave the trusted, traditional way of doing things for some method strange and unproven.

THE PARTY

The other agency for promoting social change is the party, working particularly through the political commissioners appointed by government as heads of administrative districts and regions. It was only natural that after the rallying call of *Uhuru* (now achieved) the other part of the slogan, *Kazi* (work—for development) should replace it as Tanu's watchword. The promotion of change has become not only the policy but also the chief activity of the party. Politicians spend their time persuading people to form cooperatives, or urging participation in self-help building schemes, or explaining the need to plant more crops. Ministers frequently spend a few hours labouring on some self-help schemes.

However, the change of aim has not been sufficient to retain party membership and organisation at the previous high level. People continue to ask "Why do we need Tanu, and why does Tanu need my subscription, now we have *Uhuru*?" Indeed, the role of the party is a question for which an answer is not yet available. With the dwindling away of all other parties, its most obvious political tasks have disappeared; and lacking an ideology, the party has not the same *raison*

d'être as the Communist party in the Soviet Union. This is partly recognised by the President, who admits that at least the need for party discipline—at elections and in parliament—has disappeared. He wants to involve the people more by having elections on the lines of American primaries, and to allow freer public discussion, especially in Parliament.

These thoughts led him to suggest at the Tanu annual conference in January, 1963, that Tanganyika become constitutionally a one-party state—in order that it might become more democratic! However, no action has yet been taken to work out the constitutional implications of these proposals.² The government has delayed this task to await the outcome of the negotiations for an East African Federation. There are signs that the government, impatient at the delay over federation, is going to go ahead. If Nyerere's proposals go through, they would undoubtedly provide for more public involvement in decision-making at the national level, but a consequence may well be greater bureaucratisation. This would mean the end of the party organisation in its present form and a merger of the party and government machines. The division between the two is already becoming blurred as transfers occur across the borderline between civil servant and politician.

There would be many who would welcome such a change. It would certainly strengthen the hand of the present civil servants in their task of administration and development. Indeed it is felt that this is the party's other shortcoming—that the politicians in charge of districts and the local party officials are in some cases a little heavy-handed in their approach to development. They are often awed by the pressure on them and their own lack of expertise to cope with their onerous task. Sometimes, unfortunately, they remember the colonial government's approach, which was to try to enforce rural development—a policy to which Tanu owes much of its support.³

This is one of the few causes for discontent with Tanu, although there is the natural

² These proposals have been published in a pamphlet, "Democracy and the Party System," by Dr. J. K. Nyerere.

³ Chief Fundikira, an ex-minister, has since emphasized this point in his letter of resignation from Tanu dated 17th December 1963.

jealousy of those who resent being left out of the sharing of jobs. The weakening of the party and the alienation of support for it is, however, only marginal and if its effects could be measured they would probably mean little change in the voting figures of the first Presidential election in November, 1962, when the Tanu leader obtained over 98 per cent of the votes in an election that was as free as any could be in the circumstances. The government and the party have undeniably got the country moving forward, despite mistakes and set-backs, in a way which would be almost impossible if there were more than one party competing for people's loyalty and enthusiasm.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Constitutional changes and other political developments at the centre are, in many ways, of secondary importance to the developments in the country. The one exception would be the new Planning Ministry. If the government and the party are to be judged it must be primarily by their impact on the country as a whole. In the long term, the stability of the government will depend on its success in the field of development. In addition, it is easy to pass legislation (after a matter of only five minutes of formality) and even to change constitutions in Tanganyika's present circumstances. Consequently, there can be a remarkable degree of flexibility in the policies and the form of government enabling changes to meet the needs of development. Too much concern with forms can often cloud the realities of a situation.

An example of this is the changing position of Julius Nyerere in the last two years. The first Prime Minister of an independent Tanganyika, he resigned in January, 1962, to the consternation of the outside world, and became just a back-bench member of Parliament, although remaining President of Tanu. On December 9, 1962, he became first President of the Republic of Tanganyika. The republican constitution gave the President a

large measure of executive powers and by retaining something of the parliamentary system ensured executive control over the legislature.⁴

Throughout this period, however, Nyerere was in effective control of the nation, whatever his constitutional position happened to be. He is a leader who is prepared to delegate authority, even the post of prime minister, which he did so that he could have a look round the country, to sort out his own ideas, to reeducate the party with something of his own ideals—and to translate Shakespeare's Julius Caesar into Swahili. His position in relation to the party was much stronger in 1963 than it had been just before and after *Uhuru*. This was probably just as important as his extra legal powers as President under the new constitution.

This stronger position has enabled him to indulge in straight-talking to his more nationalistic followers who do not share his own ideals. He has come out in the latter part of 1963 with a strong attack on any "personality cult," condemning not only the pomp with which some would like to surround him, but the pretensions of grandeur of lesser political leaders. He is concerned not merely with promoting a democratic image but with the danger of a widening gap between leaders and people.

Another oft-repeated theme has been the danger of racialism. An address to the party on its birthday last year contained an exhortation to party members to burn their party cards on the spot if they thought that the Africans should dominate other races. Partly due to his example, the racial problem has probably improved since the early days of independence, when there were one or two minor incidents and when the pressure for the "Africanisation" of the civil service was greater. Certainly Europeans and Asians have learned to treat Africans with greater respect. While there has never been any racial antagonism in Tanganyika, it has always been wrong to picture the country as a paradise of racial harmony; it is one rather of peaceful coexistence. The relative absence of strife in Tanganyika, compared with difficulties in neighbouring Kenya and Central Africa, is

⁴ The nature of the Constitution is set out in simple form in Government Paper No. 1, 1962—"Proposals of the Government for a Republic."

partly due to lack of contact. There is probably less social intercourse than in Kenya, at least, and intermarriage is virtually unknown. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the immigrant races retain a privileged economic and social position, and it is inevitable that the privilege, if not the racial community as such, will be attacked. Thus the government's birthday gift to the nation on the second anniversary of independence was the take-over of the exclusive European "club"—one of the chief symbols of this privilege. It is now a genuinely non-racial club.

The Europeans are only a tiny minority anyway (some 20,000, of whom very few could be called settlers) and the position of the 120,000 Asians is much less secure. Traditionally, they are the traders and shop-keepers, and form a social and racial buffer between Europeans and Africans. Thus, feeling against them is stronger. They tend to be separatist, even among themselves, and but for their foresightedness in the 1950's in siding with Tanu, their future would be even less rosy. There are, then, possibilities of tensions against which the greatest safeguards are the present attitudes of the country's leaders and the rapid advancement of the African population.

LEADERSHIP

In many other fields, too, much depends on the present leadership. Here I would include other ministers as well as Nyerere himself. His reputation in the world outside is more and more what it was in Britain, that of "everyone's favourite African Politician," but few realise that the stability of the government depends to a great extent on the close cooperation of other leaders. In particular, I would pick out Oscar Kambona, the Minister for External Affairs and Defence, and Secretary-General of the party, and Rashidi Kawawa, who took over as Prime Minister in 1962 and is now the Vice-President. Among the three men there is great mutual confidence, and Kawawa, particularly, with his common sense and eye for administrative detail, is the perfect complement to Nyerere's somewhat philosophical concern.



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African opinion had always opposed further union in East Africa as a settler idea, but attitudes began to change with Tanganyika's approach to independence in the late 1950's. It was in 1958 that the Pan-Africa Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (P.A.F.M.E.C.A.) was set up to provide functional cooperation among the nationalist movements.

The idea of federation was taken a stage further in June, 1960, when Nyerere made his now famous offer to delay Tanganyika's *Uhuru* so that federation and independence

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This specialist, after outlining the phases in Kenya's struggle towards her newly-won independence, concludes by saying, "But unless things go seriously wrong—something which could happen if there were a serious failure to measure up to the nation's major problems—the chances of a stable government developing in Kenya are not too remote."

"Harambee" in Kenya

By COLIN LEGUM

Commonwealth Correspondent for the London Observer

ON DECEMBER 12, 1963, Kenya finally ended its turbulent struggle for independence. Always regarded as the *enfant terrible* of the British colonial family in Africa, Kenya was one of the political pace-setters on the continent. Yet it was among the last of the three large African territories to achieve independence: the other two being Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia. What this trio had in common was the presence of sizable white communities. Their presence stimulated development, sharpened racial rivalry, heightened political consciousness, but delayed independence.

Kenya's struggle for independence divides naturally into three overlapping phases. In the first phase, roughly between the two world wars, the struggle was mainly between the British settlers—led by pioneer figures like Lord Delamere—and the British Colonial Office. The settlers aspired to achieve an élite white government as in South Africa and in the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia. But their strenuous, and at times rebellious, demands were defeated largely through the efforts of the Church missionary societies and radical British politicians. One of the effects of this conflict, however, was to arouse in the Kikuyu tribe the first flickerings of African nationalism.

This development shaped the second phase which became increasingly a conflict between the Kikuyu tribe and the settlers, with the

Colonial Office at times holding the balance between them and at times siding with the settlers. This phase—which began with the formation of the Young Kikuyu Association by a government telephone operator, Harry Thuku, at the end of World War I—reached a climacteric in the violence of the Mau Mau rebellion (1952–1959).

During this period tribes other than the Kikuyu played only a tangential role in Kenya's political affairs. The central issue was one of land. White settlement in Kenya had taken place mainly in the central province, the traditional home of the Kikuyu and of nomadic Kalenjin tribes like the Masai. The new capital, Nairobi, was right in the middle of the Kikuyu homeland, and the Christian missionaries concentrated their activities, especially their schools, among the Kikuyu. Thus the Kikuyu felt the impact of the West more sharply than any other tribe. Many accepted Christianity and modernism; the majority, however, clung tenaciously to their old ways. This cleavage produced deep tensions among the Kikuyu themselves, and sharpened the minds of a naturally gifted people.

The Kikuyu were energetic and ambitious, quick to learn, but slow to give up their fierce ethnocentricity. Above all, they were a people with a grievance. They believed that an important part of their tribal lands had been "stolen" from them by the settlers who had

established themselves on 7.5 million acres in an area which came to be known as the White Highlands because only whites were allowed to own land there.

The settlers, once established on their farms, quickly struck deep roots in the country. They were as adamant in their determination to hold on to the land (which they sincerely believed was fairly theirs) as the Kikuyu were in their determination to reclaim "the stolen lands." The White Highlands came to be regarded as a symbol of white exclusivity in a country predominantly black.

Two factors made land the touchstone of all Kenya politics, and gave it a strongly racial overtone: the real land hunger felt by the Kikuyu, and the sincere belief of both the Kikuyu and the settlers that their respective claims to the White Highlands were justified. Neither side could be dissuaded from this belief. No discussion on the Highlands could be conducted rationally. On this issue the Kikuyu sharpened their political consciousness, and African nationalism was forged.

THE MAU MAU INFLUENCE

The Mau Mau rebellion, which started as a Kikuyu tribal rebellion with strongly atavistic features, ended as a nationalist movement. Even though the majority of the other ethnic communities did not actively support Mau Mau, the tenacity and audacity of the challenge to white rule that it represented were widely respected. Even those bitterly opposed to Mau Mau came to feel that the rebellion struck a decisive blow at the political dominance of the settlers.

There can be no doubt that Mau Mau succeeded in destroying the old Kenya. Even in the middle of the rebellion, white attitudes underwent radical changes. Colour bar practices began to fall away. The white community—hitherto strongly united on major issues—became divided between moderates and extremists; and the moderates came out on top. Britain, too, was alerted to the fact that Kenya could no longer be denied representative government. But perhaps the most

important result of Mau Mau was the political awakening of Africans of all tribes.

Thus Mau Mau ushered in the third phase of the independence struggle. Now the issue was no longer between the settlers and the Kikuyu; it was no longer even a question of colonialism or independence. The issue had become a struggle for power among the various communities in Kenya. For although the first reaction to Mau Mau was to create a united African political leadership, this development did not last long. The African Elected Members' Organisation split into two wings: the Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.).

MILITANT NATIONALISM

K.A.N.U. came to represent militant African nationalism. Although its activating force had been the Kikuyu, its appeal spread to include several of the other large tribes like the Luo, the Kamba and the Meru. And even though the Kikuyu and the Luo are the two pillars on which K.A.N.U. power mainly rests, there is almost no part of the country in which it has not come to enjoy a considerable measure of support. Its charismatic leader was and is Jomo Kenyatta whose authority remains almost unchallengeable as "the Father of the Nation" or, as he is simply called, "Mzee"—The Old Man. K.A.N.U.'s leadership as a whole, though concentrated largely in the hands of the Kikuyu and Luo, has been extended to make place for representatives of the other tribal and ethnic groups. But, although several prominent Europeans and Asians joined K.A.N.U., it failed, at first, to win substantial support from the immigrant communities.

These communities mostly preferred to support K.A.D.U., which emerged as the champion of the weaker ethnic groups that felt, or claimed to feel, threatened by the large tribes which were dominant in K.A.N.U. Thus K.A.D.U. saw itself as a defense political movement seeking to safeguard "the weak" against "the strong." It brought together not only many of the whites and the Asians but also a variety of other ethnic groups such

as the Kalenjin peoples (the nomads of the Rift Valley), the people of the coastal strip, and the Baluhya. Under the leadership of Ronald Ngala (for a time Chief Minister of Kenya), Musinde Muliro, Arap Moi and Taita Towett, K.A.D.U. championed independence as vigorously as K.A.N.U.

Where the two movements disagreed was on the fundamental principles to be stated in an independence constitution. K.A.N.U. favoured a strong unitary form of government with elaborate safeguards for individual human rights. K.A.D.U. favoured a loose federal constitution, based on strongly-entrenched regions and a comparatively weak central government. The settlers and many of the Asians tended, at first, to support this federalist idea.

The struggle between unitary government and federalism characterized the third phase of the independence struggle, which lasted from about 1960 to early 1963. But there is another important feature of this phase: the "forgiveness" preached by Jomo Kenyatta towards the settlers. He went out of his way to seek white and Asian support for K.A.N.U. Meeting white farmers in the Highlands, he asked forgiveness for mistakes on both sides. He firmly supported the policy of paying full compensation for all farms taken over in the Highlands, and came out in favour of a planned system of land resettlement.

Kenyatta's policy was made possible by the decision of the settlers' leaders to accept the agreement reached at the famous Lancaster House constitutional conference in London in 1960, when the then Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, came out in favour of African majority rule for Kenya. But even before this decisive step was taken, the settlers' leaders had themselves agreed to abandon the sacrosanctity of white settlement in the Highlands. This was a major retreat taken under pressure from the moderate white leaders who believed that this retreat was essential to encourage moderate policies in the African leadership. But three more bitter years of political rivalry had to be endured before a second Lancaster House conference adopted a constitution acceptable to K.A.N.U.—a policy

decision which became inevitable after K.A.D.U. had gone down to a heavy electoral defeat in the early part of 1963.

Thus victory went to the militant nationalists, and K.A.N.U. emerged at the end of the long struggle for independence as the dominant political force. It controlled almost three-quarters of the membership of the legislature, and was entrusted with a constitution largely of its own making. As the inheritor of British power, Kenyatta's government was faced with a number of challenging problems, any one of which was capable of producing serious upheavals.

NATION-BUILDING

The greatest of these problems is one that is common to all emergent states in tropical Africa: the task of nation-building. Whatever else colonialism might have achieved in Africa, nowhere has it been able to weld the numerous, diverse tribes into a single nation. Colonialism in Africa, in fact, has stood Europe's own history on its head by creating the nation-state before the nation. It has been left to the new leaders to build the nation.

So far, almost without exception in the new states of Africa the difficulties encountered in trying to reconcile tribal and other particularist interests with the overriding needs of the new state have resulted in the setting up of a single-party state, at least as a temporary substitute for the homogeneous society.

What complicates this task of nation-building in Kenya is the presence of so many diverse racial as well as tribal communities. At the last census in 1962 there were 8,676,000 people of whom 178,000 were Asian, 66,000 were white, and 39,000 were Arab. The Africans were divided into 60 ethnic communities with five of these (the Kikuyu, Luo, Baluhya, Kamba and Meru) accounting for 65 per cent of the total.

The minority groups are all naturally fearful of their future. The smaller tribes are anxious about their land and local development. The Asians and Arabs are concerned about opportunities for work and trade, and for promotion on merit in the civil service.

The whites are anxious about their place in the new society now that they have lost their political importance, and always fearful of the dangers of *revanchisme*.

The more extreme younger elements tend everywhere in Africa to develop a greater sense of chauvinism than the older generation which, for the greater part, has learned how to cope with its own aggressive tendencies. Many whites are also suspicious of the role which the former Mau Mau forest fighters will be able to exercise on Kenyatta's government. Hundreds of Mau Mau have emerged from the underground since independence. That they will demand "rewards" from the newly-independent society is certain; but on the whole their demands, which are mainly for land, should not be too difficult to meet. Some of the leaders may, however, have higher ambitions. If frustrated, they might find it easier to express their dissatisfaction against the whites or Asians than against an African government led by Kenyatta. This is undoubtedly a source of anxiety, although it should not be unduly exaggerated. Kenyatta has already shown his toughness in standing up to his own supporters when he has felt that they were driving him too hard. But how long can he resist these pressures?

This question arises especially when one considers the problem of the landless Kikuyu. The whole independence struggle, as far as they are concerned, was waged over land—particularly the land in the Highlands. If independence does not bring them land, or some alternative form of livelihood, they are bound to react. Already there are signs of reaction. One secret society in Kikuyuland is pledged to obtaining all the land from the whites not for the Africans as a whole, but for the Kikuyu. This aim is blatantly chauvinistic; but it is also a true expression of the deep needs of the Kikuyu landless peasants. This secret society has already dared to say that "we have not elected Mr. Kenyatta to be our new white man."

Kenyatta is under no illusions about the needs of his own land-hungry people. At some point he will have to decide between a speeded up, and possibly unscientific, land

settlement policy, or the possibility of open disaffection from a section of the Kikuyu. This is a real dilemma.

The great majority of the white farmers are now reconciled to giving up their farms for fair compensation. The problem, therefore, is not one of expropriating land from the whites. It is one of finding capital to pay decent compensation, and more important, to find capital to develop viable farming units for the penniless peasants. A solution needs time and planning. Will the peasants be willing to give their leaders time?

The answer to this question would be easier to discover if the Kenya economy were not so badly run down. The Kenyatta government is taking over a country that has been virtually bankrupted by the political events of recent years. Confidence in its economy has been badly shattered, and it is only now slowly recovering. Kenya cannot begin to pay for development without heavy international aid. And it dare not suddenly disrupt its present agricultural economy (largely based on white farms) for fear of further upsetting its economy.

Its great need is for more productive agriculture, and for a great expansion of light industry. This latter development is needed especially to make some impression on the tens of thousands of unemployed in Nairobi and in the other large towns. For if landlessness is a major problem in some parts of the countryside, urban unemployment is the other side of the same problem. Unless the unemployed feel that *their* government is doing more for them than the alien government did, Kenyatta can expect trouble in the towns as well. Therefore, the extent to which the international community is willing to underwrite Kenya's independence, until it can get its own economy moving again, is perhaps the crucial long-term factor in the Kenya situation.

Linked to this future is the question of Kenya's relationships with its neighbours. With some of these neighbours the prospects are extremely favourable; but with Somalia the situation looks grim. Let us look first at the optimistic picture.

AN EAST AFRICAN FEDERATION

The Kenyatta government is deeply committed to the idea of forming an East African Federation with Tanganyika and Uganda, and possibly with Zanzibar.¹ Considerable progress has already been made towards this goal. The basis of a federation already exists in the East African Common Services Organisation. E.A.C.S.O. (as this organisation is known) provides many of the services for the East African territories. For example, they share a common railway system as well as other forms of communication; they operate a single statistics and research unit; they have created a single University of East Africa. But the leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika wish to convert this economic association into a fully integrated political union or federation. A draft constitution for such a federation has already been prepared.

It was hoped that the East African Federation would come into being at the same time Kenya achieved its independence; but last-minute objections from Uganda have delayed this project. The accomplishment of a federation would undoubtedly alter not only the political face of East Africa but provide Kenya with its optimum opportunity to establish economic and political stability. Although it is difficult to estimate the chances for this federation to become a reality, there are nevertheless good reasons for measured optimism.

The most worrying short-term danger to Kenya is undoubtedly the quarrel with the Somalis over the Northern Frontier District. The N.F.D. forms a considerable part of Kenya's Northern Province which covers almost half the country's total area, spreading from Somalia in the northeast to Uganda in the southwest, and marching along the southern borders of Ethiopia and the Sudan. This vast expanse of 130 thousand square miles of semi-desert is the home of 220

thousand pastoral nomads. Just over one-fourth of them are Somalis, another quarter are Galla tribesmen who have affinities with Ethiopia, and 100 thousand are Turkana. But the difficult problem in this area lies with the Somalis who seek to join "their part" of Kenya with Somalia which they feel is more truly their homeland.

A Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the British Government in 1962 to ascertain the real wishes of the Somalis. They found an overwhelming desire for a close relationship with Somalia. Since then the Kenya Somalis demonstrated these wishes by successfully boycotting the pre-independence elections for the Kenya legislature and for their regional council.

Somalia has all along given strong support to the Kenya Somalis' demand for the right of self-determination. But all the Kenya leaders (both K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U.) have unanimously rejected the Somalis' demands. This deadlock has already produced a serious irredentist problem. Relations between Kenya and Somalia have deteriorated to an alarming point. This simmering conflict has resulted in strengthening Kenya's relationship with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia, too, has a frontier problem with the Somalis, and is therefore anxious to strengthen Kenya's hand. A defense agreement has been signed between Kenya and Ethiopia. It is hard to believe that the outcome will be war, but one cannot be altogether sanguine because intransigence and patriotism are always explosive elements—and the Horn of Africa² is not likely to escape altogether the dangers of conflict.

PAN AFRICA

Because of Kenya's long history of struggle for independence, her leaders have naturally played a significant role in Pan-African affairs. Kenyatta is regarded as perhaps the doyen of all nationalist leaders in Africa. His prestige is enormous, and this ensures for Kenya an important role.

Apart from Mr. Kenyatta, there are other Kenyan leaders who have also made their mark on the continent. Tom Mboya, the

¹ The January 12th overthrow of the government of Sheik Mohammed Shante Hamadi may ultimately effect Zanzibar's position on this issue.

² See map, page 157.

first chairman of the All African Peoples Organisation, is one of the outstanding Pan-African trade union leaders. Oginga Odinga, a familiar and popular figure, is highly regarded especially in radical circles. Peter Mbiyu Koinange, Kenya's Minister in charge of Pan-African Affairs, ranks in age and experience with Kenyatta himself. And Joseph Murumbi, long prominent in exile politics in Europe and Africa, comes to the office of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs with many contacts throughout the continent.

Kenya has played a leading role in the development of P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A.—the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa. This role gives it considerable influence in the 20 countries which lie between the Great Lakes of Central Africa and the Indian Ocean. But its influence runs much further afield especially in West Africa and the Congo. Its relations with Ghana, however, are not very good at present. This is mainly because of President Kwame Nkrumah's opposition to the idea of an East African Federation. And although its relations with Egypt are friendly, they are not particularly close.

LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Even before its independence, Kenya committed itself wholly to assisting the "liberation struggle" in Southern Africa. As an independent country, it can be relied upon to support Tanganyika's militant policies on this question. Within the Organisation of African Unity, it can be expected to join the radical rather than the revolutionary wing of Pan-Africanism.

One final question calls for some comment. How united is Kenyatta's government? Like all governments produced by a national liberation struggle it is a coalition government representing widely different political views. The clash of policies between the two Luo leaders—Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga—are well-known; there are equally sharp conflicts among other personalities. There are also bound to be suspicions among leaders of the smaller tribes about the role they will be allowed to play.

The cabinet itself includes men of the left as well as of the right. There are old stalwarts anxious to secure proper recognition of their services, and young men resentful that their age is held as of greater consequence than their qualifications. There are Mau Mau leaders who resent the fact that non-fighters have achieved higher rewards than themselves.

FORCE FOR RECONCILIATION

But although these fissiparous tendencies exist, there are counterforces which make the dangers less ominous than a mere listing of the disruptive forces would suggest. Strange as it may seem, the greatest force of conciliation is Kenyatta himself. Although there is still some African suspicion of him as a "Kikuyu leader," he has shown a special knack for being able to get the most disparate elements to work together in a team. The January, 1964, revolt by the military was one test.

But unless things go seriously wrong—something which could happen if there were a serious failure to measure up to the nation's major problems—the chances of a stable government developing in Kenya are not too remote. The Kenyatta government's success will be judged also by its ability to retain in the cabinet representatives from all the racial communities: The inclusion in the administration of two whites, along with two Asians and Arabs, as ministers is perhaps the truest expression of non-racial government. It is certainly an encouraging sign of racial tolerance and an expression of Kenyatta's motto for independent Kenya—"Harambee"—or, "pulling together."

Colin Legum was born in South Africa and was a newspaperman at 16. A member of the Johannesburg City Council, for years he was prominent in South African politics. He joined the *Observer* in London in 1949 and has served on its staff ever since. Among his works on Africa are *Must We Lose Africa?* *Bandung, Cairo and Accra*; *Attitude to Africa* and *Congo Disaster*. In addition, he has edited *Africa: A Handbook to the Continent*.

In outlining the beginnings of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this author comments that although "the whole concept was violently opposed by [some]," . . . the Federation "began, nonetheless, with an enthusiasm and energy which could have been a good augury. In retrospect, however, within four years the signs of its eventual failure were written on the wall for those who wished to read."

The Rhodesias and Nyasaland

By F. M. G. WILLSON

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ON DECEMBER 31, 1963, there came to an end the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Its dissolution, like its formal inauguration in September, 1953, was authorised by an Order-in-Council of the British government. The decade between the two orders had witnessed an experiment in public affairs more than usually compounded of mistakes and uncertainty. Passionate ideas and opposing interests within Central Africa were set against a pattern of developing attitudes in Africa as a whole, and in the world generally, which was in most respects antipathetic to the concept of government closest to the hearts of those who wielded power in Salisbury.

At a time when recrimination is deep and bitter, and when the ten year old structure is in process of being dismantled, it is impossible to make final judgments or to allot praise and blame with any assurance of justice. All that can be attempted here is to outline the story, to suggest some explanations, and to glance into the future.

In the largest and longest perspective, it might be claimed that the failure of the Federation was due to geography and time, in equal measure. The federal scheme brought together three territories which were almost cradled by the surrounding eastern,

southern and western lands dominated by the "white" régimes of Mozambique, South Africa and Angola. Lying across their northern boundaries, however, were countries which must have seemed destined—since well before 1953—to develop only as African states. This is evident even making all allowance for the fact of European control and for the existence of sizeable pockets of European settlement in Katanga and, much further north, in Kenya. The contrast of tendencies in political and racial terms was reflected from the outset inside the Federation. Two northern units shared—or were conscious of having shared up to 1953—in the slow but apparently certain progress towards becoming part of a developed "black" Africa. At the same time Southern Rhodesia's political experience had been for two generations more akin to the South African pattern of entrenched white control. The line of the Zambesi between Northern and Southern Rhodesia has come, indeed, to be regarded as an ideological more than as a physical barrier.

In terms of sheer chronology, the experiment of federation, with its implied prospect of a controlled development under European hegemony lasting many years before power passed into African hands, was caught be-

tween the rapidly accelerating force and success of African nationalism to the north, and the consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism based on *apartheid*, to the south. Whether any half-way house could have succeeded in the circumstances of the 1950's and 1960's is, in this context, at least questionable. As it was, the "half-way" offered was not acceptable to the two northern parts of the Federation, while a further advance in terms of a wider sharing of political power with the African peoples was not acceptable to the European electorate. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, riding the crest of the wave of world opinion, were able to force the right of secession out of the British government. For the Europeans who created and dominated the Federal parliament and government, both the times and the place, whether or not they could have been better manipulated, must have seemed "out of joint."

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

All three territories had come under British control around 1890 as the result of a peculiar combination of missionary zeal, commercial adventure (spearheaded by the genius of the pirate-philosopher Cecil John Rhodes) and British imperial self-interest in the face of competition from Germany, Belgium and Portugal. It was not until the turn of the century that the administration settled down, however, because in the 1890's rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, followed by the repercussions of the Boer War, retarded development. Henceforward, the 50 years before Federation saw a remarkable economic growth in the two Rhodesias. The southern territory's mineral potential did not come up to the expectation of Rhodes and his colleagues, though substantial coal deposits are worked, but the major external income came from the introduction of tobacco. Southern Rhodesia is now the second largest producer in the world, being responsible for about 15 per cent of the total output. Northern Rhodesia's economy was almost stagnant until the 1920's, when copper was first mined on a large scale. Since the depression of the 1930's the Copperbelt has become a major source of

the metal and is the reason why the country is potentially one of the richest of Africa's new states.

Both the Rhodesias, though their populations have grown and are growing quickly, are relatively sparsely peopled. Only in very recent years has land hunger threatened to become a major factor in Southern Rhodesia, where the problem is immensely complicated by the existence of large tracts of land reserved for European farming. No comparable problem has yet arisen in Northern Rhodesia. By contrast, Nyasaland has a high density population entirely dependent on agriculture. Relatively little economic development has taken place there, and one of the major exports of the country is manpower. There is a very large Nyasa labour force in Southern Rhodesia and a considerable number of Nyasas work in the northern copper mines.

European settlement is most heavily concentrated in Southern Rhodesia. By 1954, there were 158,000 Europeans there and this figure rose to 224,000 by 1963. In Northern Rhodesia, the bulk of the European population is concentrated on the Copperbelt and along the "line of rail" from Livingstone in the far southwest through Lusaka to the mining towns. There were 53,000 Europeans in 1954 and 76,000 nine years later.

Nyasaland's European population has always been almost token, with very little settlement; the figures for 1953 and 1963 were 5,000 and 9,000 respectively. Non-African immigration was heavy until 1958, when there was a considerable slowing down, and in each of the years 1961, 1962 and 1963 there were small net losses of non-African population. From very recent sample censuses it is clear that the African population of the area has hitherto been underestimated. It is now thought that Africans number between three and four million in each of the three countries. The Asian and Coloured communities in all three territories are small—19,200 in Southern Rhodesia, 10,900 in Northern Rhodesia and 13,100 in Nyasaland as of June 30, 1963.

That there has been considerable economic

growth, at least in the Rhodesias, since 1953, is uncontroversial. Apart from the success of copper and tobacco, a sizeable increase in manufacturing industry has taken place, predominantly in Southern Rhodesia, while there has been heavy investment in such projects as the Kariba hydro-electric scheme and in irrigation. The main railway network was completed half a century ago, but some extra links have been forged, while surfaced road development in the Rhodesias has been greatly advanced.

What is now engaging economists in controversy is the extent to which all or any of this growth is attributable to federation, and how the benefits of that growth have been distributed among the territories. Undoubtedly Nyasaland has been subsidised heavily, but little basic development seems to have accrued to that country. The argument has now become almost academic, though not less lively on that account, but it is worth recording that official insistence on the economic benefits of federation has been challenged to no small extent by independent analysts of the situation.

Politically and constitutionally each of the three territories had reached a different stage of development in 1953. All three had been administered at first, after European occupation, by the chartered British South Africa Company. Nyasaland became a Protectorate of Britain in 1891, and Northern Rhodesia followed suit in 1924. Southern Rhodesia's European settlers demanded and received a form of representative government as early as 1898, and in 1922 by referendum chose responsible government as a British Colony instead of union with South Africa. Thus, for 30 years prior to federation, Southern Rhodesia had been a colony, self-governing in its internal affairs and operating a cabinet system. The franchise was legally non-racial, but the qualifications were such that while practically all Europeans were entitled to vote, virtually only a handful of Africans were ever enrolled.

By contrast, the two northern countries were at an early point on the orthodox road of progress towards that eventual self-govern-

ment common to the British dependencies. Representation of minorities through nominated "unofficial" members in the Legislative Councils began in Nyasaland in 1908 and in Northern Rhodesia in 1924. Direct election was not introduced into Nyasaland until after Federation began, but in 1926 direct election of European members of the Council was started in Northern Rhodesia. African members first sat in Council in Northern Rhodesia in 1948 and in Nyasaland in the following year, but they were nominated persons.

At the beginning of federation, Northern Rhodesia had a Legislative Council with a majority of unofficial members and a minority of elected members. In Nyasaland, in 1953, the Legislative Council was entirely nominated, with equal numbers of official and unofficial members. In each territory, the real power rested unequivocally with the British government through its representative, the governor.

The character of politics is nowadays often interpreted as having been built consciously on the theme of racial separation from the beginning, especially in Southern Rhodesia; the implication being that every legislative provision was calculated in terms of the need to exclude Africans from any possibility of political advancement. While this may have been the practical effect, the idea of premeditation is in large part a mis-reading of the motives. Until at least World War II it appeared to the great majority of Europeans in Central Africa that African participation in national politics on anything but a minimal scale was a pipedream that would require decades if not a century for realization. Much economic legislation was designed to meet the immediate needs of situations which were almost completely European in origin and apparent potential, while control of African affairs was more often than not exercised on the basis of a genuine if muddled paternalism.

Political movements among Africans were so limited in Southern Rhodesia as to be discounted. Almost no sign of the ardent nationalism to come was visible in Nyasaland,

and only in Northern Rhodesia was there, at the time of federation, any strong, articulate expression of African political opinion. This does not necessarily excuse a lack of far-sightedness on the part either of the British government or of the Europeans in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, nor can it justify all subsequent mistakes; but the historian with a larger view in the future may well wish to develop these themes as a corrective to some of the more extreme interpretations of recent years.

In assessing the situation at the beginning of Federation the character of administration was probably more important than political movements. Southern Rhodesia had a civil service overwhelmingly European in composition, locally recruited, small, inward-looking—a compact and self-sufficient machine, controlled by locally-oriented politicians. The two northern countries were administered by the British Colonial Services—expatriate birds-of-passage, devoted specialist administrators, sometimes looking elsewhere for promotion and all looking homeward to Britain for retirement and security; moulded in a tradition of bringing indigenous peoples to self-government; without roots in their country of service, though often passionate in their concern for its inhabitants; and without material interests to protect other than their careers, which in 1953 must have seemed safe for their lifetimes.

These, then, were the main background factors against which the Federation was created. Federation was a concept largely engineered by a master political craftsman, then Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins (now Lord Malvern). It was seen as a desirable development by many in the United Kingdom as well as by most of the Europeans in Central Africa; it was in line with the orthodox view that large economic units would flourish better than small ones, and that a federal scheme was the best compromise to achieve that end. No doubt it reflected some interest in boosting and entrenching the position of the European community, and it afforded an opportunity to append the poor economy of Nyasaland to

that of more prosperous neighbours. It may even have appeared to the British government a good strategic move to establish a large entity with a considerable military strength on the northern border of a South Africa whose political development was causing increasing concern.

The whole concept was violently opposed by the small group of articulate and politically conscious Africans in the north, though it is probable that Southern Rhodesian Africans welcomed federation as a chance of improving their position *vis-a-vis* the Europeans. It was not beloved of many of the colonial civil servants in the northern territories, and it was seen as a betrayal of African interests by at least some sections of the British Labour Party and by many enthusiasts for African advancement. It began, nonetheless, with an enthusiasm and energy which could have been a good augury. In retrospect, however, within four years the signs of its eventual failure were written on the wall for those who wished to read.

"PARTNERSHIP" AND FRUSTRATION

Insofar as the creators and sustainers of federation had a cohesive philosophy, it was described as "partnership"—the idea of a working together of the different races in a multi-racial society in which merit should be the sole criterion of success. Unfortunately the doctrine, if such it can be called, was so vague that it was interpreted at one extreme as permitting a virtual continuance of the racial *status quo* for an indefinite period, and at the other extreme as demanding at least an initial parity of power racially with an early progression to African majority rule.

Looking back, it might be suggested that the only real hope for the success of federation was the immediate and whole-hearted application of a form of "partnership" heavily biased towards the advancement of African political interests. Only such a policy would have reconciled the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans to a scheme which they had always regarded with suspicion, and would have retained the loyalties of the Southern Rhodesian Africans who were

prepared to give the federation a fair chance.

But in fact no such fullblooded move to involve Africans in the political system was made. The federal constitution itself provided for a racial approach, for instance, in that European agriculture and education were made federal functions while their African counterparts remained territorial responsibilities. The franchise throughout was so qualified that there was no likelihood of Africans enjoying early parity of representation, let alone majority rule. The federal civil service, locally organized, was inevitably largely European at its responsible levels, but no plan to launch a crash-programme for training Africans was started. And on the normal everyday levels of living, social discrimination between the races continued with little modification.

To deny that the sheer practical difficulties of achieving any real degree of "partnership" were in any event enormous, would be stupid: but the hard fact is that in the eyes of the Africans the attempt to meet their idea of what "partnership" should mean was negligible and soon came to be regarded as hypocritical and contemptible. As a result, the sense of frustration and bitterness with federation provided, especially in the two northern territories, a focus for political agitation which probably advanced the cause of African nationalism by a decade.

The political history of a federation of only three units cannot be separated into water-tight federal and territorial narratives, but the fate of federation *per se* can best be dealt with first. This is possible because, while power and influence—and much ability—was concentrated to a great extent in the federal parliament and administration, the politics of the federal system were oddly detached—an activity somehow carried on in a social vacuum.

The two federal Prime Ministers—Huggins and his successor, Sir Roy Welensky—towered above almost all other political figures in the area, but in the federal parliamentary scheme of things formal opposition was slight and divided—the ruling party always had massive majorities in the Assembly—and the federal

electorate had little or no cohesion. No African opposition was ever effectively organized at the federal level. Indeed, despite the enormous publicity given to federation, there did not seem to develop any deeply felt sense of belonging to it which could shake the firmly rooted, primary interest and concern of the inhabitants, of whatever race, for their own territories.

The federal era fell into three periods. From its origin to 1957 might be called the period of growing African disillusionment. This reached its peak when a constitutional amendment was proposed by the federal government to increase the size of the Assembly and to make certain alterations in the system of representation. Strong objection was made by the African Affairs Board, a standing committee of the Assembly which had power to hold up constitutional changes and to force reference to the British government. Despite the objection that the new representation would work against African political progress, the British government overruled the Board. It is probable that after that decision most African and pro-African opinion gave up any remaining trust in the federal concept.

From 1957 to 1960 was a period in which active and sometimes violent opposition first manifested itself, particularly in Nyasaland—ironically the territory which stood to gain most, economically, from federation. This was a time when increasing attention to and criticism of the political setup was found both within and outside Central Africa, notably in other African states and in Britain. In 1960, a commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Monckton to review the federal experience and to make recommendations—this being a statutory obligation provided for in the act creating the federation.

The commission's report was submitted in October, 1960, and stated that the dissolution of the federation would be undesirable on economic grounds. The report's major and explosive significance, however, lay in its suggestion that the individual territories should be given the right to secede. Here,

in a sentence, was the fruit of opposition which had been building up for at least three years and which had drawn on the previous resentment against the establishment of federation in 1953.

The Monckton Commission's recommendation about secession marked the beginning of the end, and from then until 1963 the pro-federal forces fought a rearguard action which became more bitter and more restricted to an argument with the British government as time passed. The federal government felt itself to have been betrayed, and embarked upon an extensive exercise to prove that promises had been made in 1953 which the British were now breaking unilaterally. The British government reaffirmed its approval of the idea of federation, but insisted that, if territories wished to secede and if the alternative was little more than continuous repression, then to prolong federation was a practical impossibility.

While the debate raged, African opposition in the north grew stronger, and the European electorate appeared to become largely indifferent to the issue. The boom of the 1950's had by now slackened, and the prospect of extensive political uncertainty must have weakened faith in the desirability of insisting on the continuance of the federal structure. Moreover there was apparent a growing European opposition to federation on the grounds that its existence made rapid African political advance inevitable. Finally, in December, 1962, the British government agreed that Nyasaland should be allowed to secede, and in the following March announced that any territory had the right to secede. This was the end of the road, and on December 31, 1963, the federation ceased to exist.

TERRITORIAL POLITICS

The politics of the territories have been relatively coherent, closely related to the milieu in which each was placed historically, and more predictable than politics in the federal sphere. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland each took paths not basically dissimilar from those followed by other British colonial territories where European settlement was

slight. Southern Rhodesia has had a more unique experience—a cross between South Africa and Algeria, on the scale of Kenya, but with local overtones which distinguish it from other broadly similar situations.

In constitutional terms, Nyasaland has undergone the most complete and rapid transition, and in the process has led both the attack on the federation and the growth of nationalism in Central Africa. From its primitive indirect representative system in 1953 grew a more advanced constitution with direct election of Europeans to the Legislative Council in 1955, and a new constitution in 1961 with a limited but still overwhelmingly African electorate.

The real starting point of a devastating political campaign, however, was the arrival in his home country in July, 1958, of Dr. Hastings Banda, who had spent his days since youth in the United States and Britain pursuing a medical career. Banda, leading the Nyasaland African Congress (later banned and replaced in 1959 by the Malawi Congress party) quickly went through the traditional experiences of the nationalist leader in British colonies—agitation, violence, imprisonment, release by grace, negotiation and respectability as the acknowledged spokesman of his people. He reiterated *ad nauseam* his scorn for the "stupid" federation; he exploited the grudges and suspicions of the intelligent and relatively homogeneous Nyasas; he gained much international sympathy and support. Free from the embarrassment of any sizeable group of European residents, he shaped the Malawi party until it operated with precision as a mass party practically without opposition. Banda extracted a wider franchise and used it to gain a triumphal electoral victory in 1961, the right to secede in December, 1962, an internally self-governing constitution in 1963, and a guarantee of independence on the sixth anniversary of his return home—July 6, 1964.

The Northern Rhodesian scene was more complex, not only because of the great European investment in copper and the presence of a sizeable European population, but also because of a much less cohesive African so-

ciety, thin on the ground, tribally divided and with one area—Barotseland—almost a separate country under a traditional kingship system and in special treaty relationship with Britain. This more diffuse pattern of political and social forces delayed the advance of concerted African nationalism, though local European concern helped to develop the representative system.

It was not until after Nyasaland's movement against federation and toward independence was well under way, however, that African political movements in Northern Rhodesia achieved striking success, and then as a coalition of two largely tribal organizations—the African National Congress under the leadership of the veteran Harry Nkumbula, and the larger United National Independence party led by Kenneth Kuanda.

A system of direct elections involving all races was introduced in 1959, and under an extremely complicated new representative pattern in 1962 the two African groups gained a majority in the Legislative Council. Full internal self-government under a one man-one vote franchise was established for January, 1964, after federation had ended and after doubts as to Barotseland's position had been settled by a sweeping U.N.I.P. victory in that country's first elections in 1963.

Parliamentary politics in Southern Rhodesia has remained primarily a European affair, with African influence increasingly important but not within the constitutional framework. In the face of growing African political consciousness all round them within the federation, the European electorate has tended by small majorities to prefer a system of siege politics. From 1954 to 1958, the Government was led by Garfield Todd, who attempted to move too fast in the direction of African advance and was unseated by his own colleagues. His successor, Sir Edgar Whitehead, found himself pushed in the same general direction of reform. Skilfully, he negotiated a new constitution and franchise in 1961 which, with full-scale African support, could bring about African majority rule in 12 to 15 years.

The European electorate accepted the con-

stitution by a majority of two-to-one, but the African nationalists refused to participate in the first general election held under it in December, 1962. Whitehead, counting on enough African support to cancel any rightward swing among the Europeans, went to the country with firm proposals to repeal the Land Apportionment Act and to make racially discriminatory practices in public places illegal. Like Todd before him—and weakened by the impending collapse of federation—he was defeated and his place taken by the present Rhodesia Front Government of Winston Field. Field is devoted to a maintenance of the *status quo* in racial matters though he accepts the 1961 Constitution. In contrast to the northern territories, in Southern Rhodesia African political organization has been seriously hampered by official action. The first major African organization, the African National Congress, was banned in 1959; its successor, the National Democratic party, suffered the same fate in 1961; and in turn the next—the Zimbabwe African People's Union—fell before authority in 1962. The leader who emerged from these disastrous experiments is Joshua Nkomo, but in July, 1963, his position was challenged when most of the leadership appointed Ndabaningi Sithole in his place. The split is not yet healed: Nkomo retains mass support for yet another organization called the People's Caretaker Council, and Sithole is the choice of many African intellectuals who adhere to his Zimbabwe African National Union.

In looking to the immediate and near future it is probably fair to claim that the prospect before Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is relatively uncomplicated. Nyasaland will reach independence as practically a one party state whose overwhelming pre-occupation must be to stimulate economic growth in a poor and heavily populated land dependent almost entirely on agriculture. It will remain in need of external aid for a very considerable period. Almost certainly the country will be renamed Malawi and will move to the status of a republic within the Commonwealth. Internal opposition to Banda is not yet in sight on any serious scale, and if it develops

it is perhaps more likely to rise in terms of a struggle for power among intra-party factions and personalities rather than along any particular tribal or geographical groupings.

Early in 1964, Kaunda's U.N.I.P. would seem to be consolidating and extending its position as the predominant party in Northern Rhodesia, but African politics there tends to remain tribal and a good deal of sporadic violence is being experienced. Thus politics will probably remain for some time, in part at least, separable from the economic aspect of development.

Northern Rhodesia is certainly the wealthiest of the three territories, though its wealth is based on a single product—copper. Efforts are likely to be concentrated on improving agriculture and on opening up the country. The project for a rail link with Tanganyika has already been planned and estimated. Such a link would enhance its long term economic development and, as a result, Northern Rhodesia could become a major African "railway junction." It would also be desirable to have a "friendly" outlet to the sea for the products of the Copperbelt.

Northern Rhodesia enters 1964 as a British protectorate, but after the general election in January the move to independence cannot be delayed much beyond late 1964 or early 1965. In neither of the two northern territories are the European and Asian communities likely to wield any further real political influence, though in common with all developing African states the need for expatriate officials and experts will continue and may even increase in the years ahead.

Nyasaland has not yet shown any marked tendency to take any major part in international or even pan-African affairs, and it may well be that her intense domestic problems will dissuade her from much diplomatic adventuring. Doubtless both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia will become members of the United Nations and will follow their Afro-Asian colleagues on an uncertain path to establish their separate identities and to remain neutral between East and West. If Kaunda remains the dominant figure in Northern Rhodesia he may well take a major

place among Africa's new leaders. He is already prominent in pan-African affairs, and has the prestige of his country's wealth behind him.

The Southern Rhodesian scene is far more vague and much more sombre. Political power still rests in European hands; the African political movement is divided and, in any case, finds great difficulty in extending its effective organization. Both wings are adamant, however, in refusing to participate in working within the terms of the existing constitution. The territory is inheriting most of the active pro-federal politicians and much of the federal civil service and armed forces, including the not inconsiderable air force.

Since the doom of federation was made clear, the Southern Rhodesia government has pressed for independence and the possibility of a unilateral declaration has been mooted among the more extreme supporters of the Rhodesia Front. Britain, harried by strong pressures from the United Nations and from within the Commonwealth, has resisted the granting of independence, but denies that she possesses any power to intervene to alter the 1961 Southern Rhodesia constitution.

Thus, at the end of 1963, stalemate exists and may well persist either until the European electorate, disillusioned by possible economic deterioration and by external political pressure, offers a compromise sufficiently advantageous to the African nationalists to win acceptance; or until, in a much darker hour, intransigence on both sides leads to major outbreaks of violence.

There is little sign that South Africa is interested in casting more than a generally

(Continued on page 180)

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Analyzing the new Somali Republic's position in the broader context of the general East-West struggle, this writer says, "In the fourth year of the existence of the Somali Republic it seems that progress toward the economic development of the country and the improvement in the living conditions of its people can be expected to continue. Yet, ironically, the prospect of continued internal instability promises the continued attention of East, West and other interested parties. . . ."

The Somali Republic

By SAADIA TOUVAL

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IT HAS BEEN said many times that the test of independence is in the use made of it. The statement implies a presumption that a nation can "shape its destiny." The actual limitations on what can be done with the tools of independent statehood are well illustrated by the performance of the Somali Republic, since it was formed on July 1, 1960. This performance happily defied some gloomy predictions, and sadly confirmed others.

The hopelessness with which the economic future was viewed has been dispelled by achievements that indicate that the prospects are better than the bleak landscape of the country had suggested. Yet the union of the former British Somaliland with the former Italian trust territory of Somalia, the component parts of the Somali Republic, has not turned out to be a happy one, despite the enthusiasm it generated. What casts a menacing shadow over the entire region is the intensification of the conflict between the Somali Republic and its neighbors, and the increasing involvement of outside powers in the regional quarrel.

Some 80 per cent of all Somalis are nomadic herdsman. They inhabit the north-eastern corner of Africa, known as the "Horn of Africa," an arid region, which barely provides subsistence to its nomadic inhabitants. There are strong cohesive ties—traditions of

common ancestry, a common language and cultural heritage, and Islamic religion—which bind Somalis, and form the basis of their national consciousness. Yet, Somali society is fragmented into tribes and clans, to which the loyalty of individuals is directed.

Towards the end of the last century Britain, Italy and France divided the Horn of Africa and delimited the boundaries of their respective possessions and the territory claimed by Ethiopia. Thus, the Somalis found themselves divided among five distinct political units: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, Kenya (then called British East Africa) and Ethiopia.

Like other African peoples, the Somalis developed grievances against the colonial powers, and after the Second World War put forth their claim to independence. This claim was coupled by their aspiration for national unification, that is, the inclusion of all Somalis and the territories they inhabited, into one nation-state. Two of the Somali territories, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, attained independence in 1960, and united to form the present Somali Republic.

The aspirations for the inclusion of the other territories inhabited by the Somalis within the Somali state met with strong objections. France did not wish to divest itself

of its possession. Moreover, the indigenous population in French Somaliland is divided on the issue, not only politically, but on ethnic grounds as well, since less than half the people of the territory are Somalis.


Ethiopian opposition to Somali claims upon portions of Ethiopia was particularly strong. Like most African states, Ethiopia lacks ethnic homogeneity and national cohesion. A claim based on ethnic grounds, if conceded, might be regarded as a precedent upon which other ethnic groups and tribes could base similar demands for secession or autonomy. Ethiopian objections were strengthened because the Somali claims were regarded as a contemporary expression of the age-long menace to Ethiopia's ancient Christian kingdom from the Muslim tribes surrounding it.

The objections of Kenya to Somali claims upon its territory were likewise vehement. It was argued that the portions of northern Kenya where the Somalis live were as much a part of the new Kenyan state as any part of the former British colony, by whichever tribe it might be inhabited.

At the time of its establishment, the Somali Republic was faced on the domestic scene with major tasks in two areas. One was the long term objective of economic development. The other was the urgent problem of achieving meaningful integration and unification of the two territories which formed the new state. Of the two tasks, economic development looked more difficult; not only because of the size of the problem and its practically unlimited scope, but because the resources required for the job were not available. On the other hand, the problem of integration seemed to be mainly administrative and capable of solution if necessary reorganization measures were undertaken. In the enthusiasm of independence and unification, political support for the necessary measures was taken for granted.

The unification of British Somaliland and the Italian administered territory of Somalia had been decided upon precipitately at a

¹ See S. Touval, *Somali Nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) pp. 110-112.



Reprinted by permission from Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, Harvard University Press, Copyright, 1963.

brief conference of political leaders in Mogadishu in April, 1960. There the principles of unification were agreed upon, but no detailed preparation was undertaken.¹

Curiously, it turned out to be easier to obtain outside aid for the tasks of economic development than to secure the internal political support needed in order to make integration a success.

The Somalis' success in obtaining large-scale foreign assistance for development should be attributed first of all to the government's skill in explaining the country's needs and eliciting aid offers. Yet, it seems that success must be attributed also to circumstances of geography and international politics which prompted various governments to invest their not unlimited resources in the Somali Republic.

The geographical circumstance becomes clear from a glance at the map. The Somali Republic lies on the shores of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Thus, it has a

political and strategic value for any country concerned with the security of sea communications through the Red Sea, a vital part of the waterway between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. At the same time the territory is of interest to any power wishing to influence or to interfere with these communications. To be sure, the Red Sea route is no longer accorded the same importance for trade or defense it held until the Second World War. But it still attracts attention. The Somali Republic's location renders it valuable for air communications as well. Such communications, although not significant in terms of the volume of trade they carry, are of considerable importance towards the development of closer relations among states, as they greatly facilitate the flow of people and information.

Geography only augmented the usual propensity of the major powers to compete for influence in new states. Their competition was intensified by the Somali Republic's eagerness for support, necessitated in turn by the Somali quarrel with neighboring states. One might have expected that the Somali quarrel with its neighbors would have caused the great powers to exercise caution, lest unwittingly they associate themselves too closely with one side and consequently suffer a diminution of their influence upon the other. Such thoughts may have crossed the minds of policy makers, and caution may be exercised. But aid is nevertheless being offered by both East and West.

DEVELOPMENT ACHIEVEMENTS

When the Somali Republic attained independence in 1960, it received economic and technical assistance from the two former administering powers, Italy and Britain, as well as from the United States, Egypt, the European Economic Community and the United Nations. Italy and Britain promised to cover the current government deficit.

² Unless stated otherwise, the sources of the information that follows on the foreign assistance rendered to the Somali Republic have been *Africa Report* (monthly, published in Washington, D.C.), and *Somali News* (weekly, published in Mogadishu).

Italy, in addition, continued to purchase the Somali banana crop under special conditions amounting actually to a subsidy. Numerous British and Italian officials remained on their jobs in the employ of the Somali government. The United States operated various assistance programs mainly in the field of agriculture, such as the organization of an agricultural extension service, livestock improvement, soil and water conservation, and development of water resources. Egypt offered considerable aid in the field of education.

The European Economic Community promised to finance the construction of a hospital. United Nations aid was offered through its specialized agencies, in a variety of fields, including education, health, agriculture and housing. In addition, United Nations experts were provided to help the government with various administrative, legal and economic problems, especially those connected with the unification and integration of the two component territories.

After independence, both the number of aid donors and the scope and size of their assistance programs increased considerably.² The country's substructure is being developed by the efforts of several nations. Western Germany has undertaken road construction projects, and has provided credits for that purpose. The harbor facilities are being expanded and improved by both the United States and Russia. The United States is building a modern port at Kismayu, which will aid the development of the Southern portion of the country and encourage the extension of banana plantations and other export crops. The Soviet Union undertook to build a deepwater port at Berbera, on the Gulf of Aden, which is expected to stimulate the development of the economically stagnant Northern Regions. The task of expanding the country's electricity generating capacity has begun with assistance from European Economic Community funds.

Development of internal air transportation was undertaken in cooperation with Italy and Western Germany. A Somali airline is being formed, with equal participation by the Somali government and "Alitalia." Italy

and Western Germany are providing the necessary training for Somali personnel. In view of the size of the country and its poor road network, the new Somali airline is expected to provide a most valuable and essential service. The Somali Republic's air communications with foreign countries are also being expanded. The country is now being served by Aden Airways, Alitalia, and United Arab Airlines. In October, 1963, it was reported that landing rights were granted to the Soviet airline "Aeroflot," which announced its intention to inaugurate soon a weekly service from Moscow via Cairo and Khartoum.

As animal husbandry and agriculture are the major economic activities, considerable attention is being devoted to their development. The United States has helped to establish an agricultural experimental station at Afghoi and a training center for farmers, at Baidoa. Banana plantations are being expanded, some of them through Italian initiative. Egypt and the Soviet Union have aided cotton cultivation. The Soviet Union has undertaken to establish cooperative grain farms and cotton and oil seed plantations.

For the time being, there is not much scope for industrialization. A revolving loan fund for local entrepreneurs, established by the United States, had little success, because of a lack of projects. Yet, it seems that a start can be made by establishing processing plants for local agricultural products. The Soviet Union undertook to establish a modern dairy plant in Mogadishu and sent experts to teach cheese production methods in some rural areas. The Russians have also signed contracts for the establishment of a meat processing factory at Kismayu, and a fish canning plant at Las Khorai on the Gulf of Aden. Germany, too, was interested to aid the fishing industry and has offered a loan for the erection of a fish processing plant. German loans were also granted toward the establishment of a textile industry. Egypt has offered financing for a textile plant, a cement factory, and animal products industries.

Progress has been recorded in the expansion

of the Somali Republic's social services, although it seems that here the results are less impressive than in some other fields. The expansion of education has continued, but, at a slower rate than prior to independence. The proportional decrease was apparently necessitated by the new demands and responsibilities incurred with independence—mainly in defense and foreign relations. As in other fields, foreign assistance has helped educational development and expansion of facilities. Egypt and the United States supplied teachers. Moreover, an institute for training elementary school teachers is being constructed at Afghoi with United States assistance, and will have a mixed staff of Somali, Egyptian and American instructors. Technical education is also expanding. Germany is helping to build a technical institute in Burao. Two other trade schools have benefited from Czechoslovak gifts of equipment.

Foreign governments and organizations have also provided a large number of scholarships for study at foreign universities. The largest contingents pursue their studies in Egypt, Italy and the Soviet Union. But students are going in increasing numbers to other countries, both West and East, including China. It is estimated that there are about 80 Somali students in the United States.

In the development of medical facilities, valuable aid has been received from several sources. Outstanding are two hospitals built as a gift by the Soviet Union, which the Soviets also promised to staff, at least for the initial period.

Among government services which have benefited from foreign assistance is broadcasting. A new transmitter and a studio are being constructed with Soviet aid, while trainees have gone to study broadcasting and preparation of radio programs in the United States.

The Somali Republic is devoting considerable resources to defense. Over 16 per cent of the government's current expenditure for 1963 was earmarked for this purpose. Here too, foreign governments have aided the training of the police, and have provided

equipment, including arms, to the police force. Army training, armaments, and supporting equipment were provided initially by Britain and Italy. Soon after independence, Egypt began supplying arms and vehicles. In the course of 1962 and 1963 the United States, Italy, Britain, and Western Germany, responded to Somali requests for additional aid, and offered \$18 million to help modernize the army and increase its strength from an estimated 4,000 men at present, to 6,000. The Western offer was, however, unacceptable to the Somalis, because its terms required the Somali government to bind itself not to take military aid from other sources. Instead, the Somali government accepted a Soviet offer of military assistance amounting to \$28 million, which will enable the expansion of the army to some 20,000 men.³

Because of the relatively underdeveloped state of its economy, the Somali government is still unable to provide for its current expenditures from domestic revenue, and has to rely on foreign subsidies. When the Somali Republic was formed, Italy and Britain undertook to pay this subsidy which amounted to some \$7 million annually. After the Somali Republic broke off diplomatic relations with Britain early in 1963 (over Britain's refusal to transfer to the Somali Republic the Kenya territories the Somalis claim), it was reported that Communist China had offered \$2.8 million as a grant to replace the British subsidy. Although the government remains heavily dependent on foreign grants, progress has been made, and domestic revenue has increased steadily for the past three years. In 1963, domestic revenue was estimated to cover some \$19.7 million out of the government's total current expenditure of \$24.7 million.

Although the country is still appallingly undeveloped, progress has been made, and there is optimism about possibilities for further development. The government apparently remains optimistic also about the future availability of financing. In July, 1963, a five-year development plan was published.

³ See *Africa Digest* (London), August, 1962; *New York Times*, November 11, 1963; and *The Times* (London), November 13, 1963.

The plan entails an expenditure of \$200 million from 1963 to 1967. The government envisaged that out of this sum \$103 million could be raised locally, while the remaining \$97 million would have to be provided by foreign sources. According to priorities allocated by the plan, development of transport facilities (roads, ports, air fields) would absorb 29 per cent of the expenditure, agriculture 18 per cent, industry 16 per cent, and housing and water supplies 8 per cent. It remains to be seen whether such an ambitious plan can indeed be carried out, and whether the provisions for its financing have been realistic.

DOMESTIC POLITICS

National unification is the creed to which the Somalis hold passionately. Yet, the union effected between the former British Somaliland and the Italian administered territory has brought in its wake increasing dissension between the two. Moreover, traditional tribal antagonisms have intensified as they have assumed an added dimension, that of political competition in a modern state.

In coping with these problems, the Somali government had the benefit of expert advice from the Consultative Commission for Integration, set up by the United Nations. Among the problems to which solutions have been found are the unification of the two civil services and the equalization of the terms of employment between the two, currency unification, equalization of customs duties and the adoption of some common legal codes.

Yet, the application of these solutions could not be achieved painlessly, and in most cases the people in the Northern Regions, the former British Somaliland, were affected more adversely. Unification was followed, in the Northern Regions, by an economic recession, as British officials left, and many Somali politicians and civil servants moved to Mogadishu, the capital. Furthermore, there followed a rise in the prices of some essential commodities in the North caused by an increase in custom duties—an increase in order to equate them with the duties in force in the Southern Regions.

The discontent caused by the economic decline and the rise in prices, was given added impetus by the shift of political and administrative centers to Mogadishu. Northerners began to feel discriminated against, and deprived of the measure of influence upon government to which they felt entitled. A diminution of influence was indeed difficult to avoid, since only one-third of the population of the newly formed republic lived in the North, which was in many respects the less developed part of the country. Upon unification, the legislatures of the Italian administered territory and British Somaliland were merged, but there the Northern deputies totaled only one-fourth of the members. A coalition government was formed, in which four northern political leaders were included as ministers. But the view that Northern ministers and deputies had lost touch with the situation in their constituencies, rapidly gained currency in the North.

The Northern discontent caused periodic crises. In the referendum on the Republic's constitution of June 20, 1961, political parties in the North campaigned against approving the constitution, while their leaders continued to sit in the government in Mogadishu. The constitution was approved by an overwhelming majority of votes counted in the country as a whole; but in the North, the majority of votes was cast against the constitution.

Then, on December 9, 1961, a group of junior officers in the North attempted to stage a *coup d'état*, with the object of effecting the secession of the Northern Regions from the Somali Republic. The attempt was easily crushed, but was symptomatic. When the trial of the twenty-one officers involved took place in February, 1963, in the Regional Tribunal of Hargeisa, the seat of the court was moved to Mogadishu, apparently in order to minimize the excitement in the North. Significantly, at the same time the trial was taking place, two government ministers conducted one of the periodic tours of the Northern Regions, with the object of mollifying disgruntled notables and politicians, and at-

tracting some popular support for the government.⁴

Popular discontent in the North came into the open again when rioting broke out in Hargeisa in April, 1963. The rioting was reportedly in protest against the rise in prices of essential commodities, caused by the increase in custom duties.

To the antagonism between the North and the South must be added other tribal rivalries. The North and the South do not form single united political blocs, but are divided within themselves along tribal-political lines. Traditionally, there were rivalries between tribes over scarce water or grazing areas. Since independence, there is also considerable political competition over influence on the government, and all that this entails in terms of patronage and other benefits.

The multiple tensions and antagonisms came to a head in September, 1962, when two Northern ministers resigned from the government. Their resignation signified the withdrawal from the coalition of the Somali National League (S.N.L.), the principal party in the North and chiefly supported by the Ishaq tribes. At the same time, the other Northern party, the United Somali Party (U.S.P.), mainly supported by the Ishaq's neighbors and rivals, remained in the government.

In the South, the dominant Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.), which had shown fissures for some time, split in November, 1962, when 12 members of the National Assembly resigned from the party and joined the Northern dissenters in opposition to the government.

The experiences of independent statehood have thus brought about the disintegration of political alliances which had existed in 1960. The Somalis' tribal fragmentation encouraged political fragmentation. But, there are indications that political realignments are gradually taking shape, as evidenced in the municipal elections of November, 1963, when various opposition groups in the North and the South combined to form new political parties. The final shape of these realignments can be expected to emerge before the general elections due in the spring of 1964.

⁴ *Somali News*, February 15 and 22, 1963. The officers were finally acquitted.

SOMALIA IRREDENTA

The relations between the Somali Republic and neighboring States have also worsened since independence. Tragically, it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. The Somali government is committed to the principle of national unification, and has been active in encouraging the Somali population in Ethiopia and Kenya to secede and annex its areas to the Somali Republic. Faced with opposition at home, the government cannot expose itself to further criticism for not pursuing vigorously the objective of national unification. Indeed, it must be tempted to promote the desperately needed domestic unity by calling attention to the unfinished task beyond the borders.

The resolve of the Somali Republic to pursue the aim of incorporating the neighboring Somali inhabited territories into a "Greater Somalia," is demonstrated by its willingness to challenge all its neighbors, and even face isolation among the African states. There has been sporadic fighting in Ethiopia between Somalis and government forces. According to some reports, the Somalis have formed a "National Liberation Army" which is organizing resistance to Ethiopian authority. In Kenya, the Somalis' refusal to cooperate with the government in setting up self-rule in the Northeastern Region, in accordance with the Kenya constitution, has been accompanied by acts of violence. Individual Somalis have been punished, and police posts have been attacked. Both the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments regard the Somali Republic as bearing responsibility for these disorders, through its propaganda broadcasts, and by its permission of the organization of armed attacks launched from its territory.

AFRICAN OPPOSITION

The Somali claim upon the neighboring territories is based upon the principle of self-determination. But, the invocation of this principle by the Somalis at various African gatherings has not aroused a favorable response. The reason seems obvious: any attempt to apply self-determination in Africa

would necessitate a revision of most frontiers, and would cause wide conflict among the African states. It would undermine African solidarity which African leaders are anxious to promote. Further, the resulting disputes over borders would facilitate foreign intervention, and thus weaken the Africans' independence. Somali claims won qualified support at the All African People's Conference at Tunis in 1960, and encountered some sympathy at the Moshi conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in February, 1963. But when the Somalis raised their claims over neighboring territories at the conferences of African states in 1960 and 1963, at the All African People's Conference in 1961, and at the Belgrade conference of non-aligned states in 1961, their appeals for support were ignored. The only African state which has come out in support of the Somali claims is Egypt which, in its broadcasts, encourages the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya to secede and to join the Somali Republic.

In the fourth year of the existence of the Somali Republic, it seems that progress toward the economic development of the country and the improvement in the living conditions of its people can be expected to continue. Yet, ironically, the prospect of continued internal instability promises the continued attention of East, West, and other interested parties, to the Somali state. The advantages of this situation seem more than balanced by the danger that the international competition, which the Somalis have thus far turned to their favor, may some day cause their return to foreign domination.

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In spite of many changes in her over-all position since independence, the Malagasy Republic still perpetuates some of her old historical patterns. As this writer points out, "the apparent political stability of [the Republic] does not mean that the old social and economic divisions have been completely submerged. Many of the most bitter disputes within the government concern the conflicting interests of the plateau and the coast."

Malagasy: Patterns and Prospects

By WILLIAM J. FOLTZ

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IN AN ERA when most new nations are struggling to impose a minimal sense of national unity on their diverse populations, the Malagasy Republic would seem exceptionally well favored. The Republic, which covers the island of Madagascar, owes its distinctiveness to the more than 400 miles of ocean that separate it from the East African coast. The island is about 228,000 square miles or roughly the size of Texas. Its people are a unique mixture of Southeast Asian, Bantu, Arab, and other strains and, though divided into tribal groups, they share a common cultural background. Their language likewise is their own, and although several distinct dialects can be noted, they are mutually intelligible and have a standard and widely used written language. With a high (by African standards) rate of school attendance and widespread literacy in both French and Malagasy, there is a background for national unity that seems ideal by comparison with conditions in the neighboring continent of Africa.

Nor is the Republic without a distinguished Malagasy political heritage, both pre-colonial

¹ See Henri Isnard, "Disparités régionales et unité à Madagascar," *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, XXXII (Jan.-June, 1962) p. 25.

² For a good summary of present knowledge, see G. P. Murdock, *Africa, Its Peoples and Their Culture History*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) pp. 212-221.

and nationalist, which should give the government an historical backing so often lacking in other new nations. With these impressive advantages it is all the more surprising that the outside observer must, as one expert put it, "continually question the depth, or even the existence of a national unity."¹

At the root of Madagascar's search for unity lies a problem of racial and social distinctions and a history of conquest and rebellion. The origins of the Malagasy people are only approximately known,² though scholars agree that they are basically Malayo-Polynesian people, and they retain many cultural features common to Southeast Asia. The fortunes of world trade and conquest, abetted by Madagascar's strategic position on both the European and Arab routes to the Indies, have mixed in other racial strains, particularly Africans of the Bantu stock, many of whom were brought over originally as slaves. While the different Malagasy peoples are racially mixed, the proportions of African and Malayo-Polynesian blood vary considerably over the island. Near the coast, among peoples like the Bara, Sakalava, and Tsimehety, dark skin and Negroid features are most common. On the central plateau, among the Merina and particularly those Merina of upper and middle caste (Hova), the Malayo-Polynesian strain is most promi-

ment. This racial difference by itself would be of little importance were it not allied to a history of Merina military and political dominance over the darker coastal peoples.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the Merina king, Andrianampoinimerina, established an efficient state organization—initially for the extension of a complex irrigation system for rice culture. With this organizational resource and the added wealth from agricultural abundance, Andrianampoinimerina began systematic raids against his neighbors to extend his plateau kingdom to the sea. His successors continued the work and, to strengthen their forces, actively sought instruction for their people from European nations. British officers helped train the Merina army in 1820; British, and later American, Protestant missionaries were encouraged to proselytize and to develop an educational system. French Catholic missionary activity was less successful among the Merina where it was confined principally to the lower social orders, in part because long-standing French missions on the coast had allied the Catholics with many of the Merina's opponents and subject peoples there.

By the middle of the century, the great majority of upper caste Merina were members of the official Protestant church, and in 1869 the Merina queen, Ranavalona II, broke definitively with traditional religion by receiving Protestant baptism. Under missionary auspices, education in the Malagasy language made rapid progress. In 1895 there were some 155,000 Merina students in missionary schools, and the capital city, Tananarive, boasted a secondary school, a technical institute, a normal school, and a medical academy.³

Against such a dynamic people, the coastal peoples could offer little resistance except in port areas where outside commercial interests, principally French, could back up the local populations with money and arms. By the 1890's, the Merina kingdom covered two-

thirds of the island and held outposts in the remaining territories. To govern these vast holdings, which covered an area almost the size of France, the Merina monarchy relied on a regular state bureaucracy with regional governors and administrators for some of the conquered lands, augmented by relationships of vassalage and tribute for the less docile peoples. The Merina actively set out to teach Merina customs and techniques to the coastal peoples. The very name of the city they established in Betsileo territory, Fianarantsoa, means "good teaching."

"LA POLITIQUE DES RACES"

It was thus a dynamic civilization in full expansion that confronted the French when, in 1895, their army defeated the Merina at the battle of Tananarive. Once the French had gained control of the island, they saw two alternative means of governing it: taking the Merina kingdom under French protection, which would have completed the "Merinization" of the island, or annexation pure and simple with destruction of the Merina hegemony. Despite pleas to the contrary from many Frenchmen on the scene, the French government decided on the latter course and sent out one of its most brilliant colonial officers, General Gallieni, to apply what came to be called "la politique des races."⁴ This policy abolished the Merina monarchy, encouraged the coastal peoples to assert their independence from the Merina by naming local headmen, extended French language schooling to the coastal peoples and sought to develop the economy of the coastal regions to the level of the Imerina plateau.

Despite initial success under Gallieni, the new policy and the development of national unity suffered greatly under the less expert guidance of the General's successors who applied little of the policy beyond its "divide and rule" aspect. In fact, little was done to promote serious economic development among the coastal populations; World War I and, later, the depression of the 1930's put an end to most of what had been started.

With limited fiscal and human resources,

³ Isnard, *op. cit.*, p. 30.


⁴ See Hubert Deschamps, *Histoire de Madagascar*, (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1960) pp. 237-260.

the French fell back on their tradition of centralized administration and concentrated on Tananarive, by then the capital of the Madagascar colony. It was the political, administrative and commercial center of the colony. Encouraged by the presence of a large market for consumer goods, and by the necessary social and physical substructure, the economy of the Tananarive province (essentially the Merina homeland) developed far faster than that of the coast. By the end of the French colonial period in Madagascar, the economic discrepancies between the central plateau and the coast were accentuated and the social discrepancies between Merina and coastal peoples were little changed.

From the purely political point of view, French policy was equally undistinguished. Through *la politique des races* the French accentuated all the disadvantages of continued Merina pre-eminence, but failed to gain the advantage of a single Merina-led Malagasy political unit. The lower ranks of the colonial administration throughout the island were staffed primarily by Merina, who thereby continued to enjoy high status compared to the coastal peoples. At the same time, many upper caste Merina resented the fact that the French denied them access to the positions of higher administrative responsibility they would have enjoyed under the pre-colonial Merina regime.

The first political reactions to the French policy were not long in coming. In 1915, a group of some 300 upper caste Merina intellectuals and students formed a secret society, the V.V.S. (from the Malagasy words for Iron, Stone, Branches), which talked of an uprising against the colonial power. The group was discovered and the young men were punished by severe prison terms. While the extent of the "plot" was undoubtedly greatly exaggerated by the French, the disaffection felt by many Merina for their colonial overlords was none the less real. The interwar period saw continued evidence of occasionally violent political disaffection.

The establishment of territorial representative political institutions under the French following World War II brought the Ma-



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THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC

lagasies their first real participation in the government of the island since 1895. Political dominance on the island was quickly gained by the *Mouvement Démocratique de la Renovation Malgache* (M.D.R.M.), among whose leaders were some who had participated in the V.V.S. years before. The M.D.R.M., which enjoyed support from the French Communist party, appealed particularly to the Hova and other young nationalist intellectuals. Many of the latter saw a radical nationalist party with Hova backing as the best way of breaking the influence of the traditional conservative coastal élites. The major opposition group, named significantly the *Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar* (P.A.D. E.S.M.), found its major strength among the coastal peoples and was openly backed by the colonial administration. Other smaller parties reflected primarily religious, caste and ethnic divisions on the island.

For reasons that remain to be fully explained, sections of the M.D.R.M. launched a full-scale armed revolt against the French regime on March 29, 1947. Armed only with ancient flintlocks and spears, the rebels had no chance, despite a prophesy that French

bullets would turn to water when they were fired. But the French were not able to restore peace to the island for a year and a half. By that time, well over 12,000 people had been killed in the terrorist attacks and in the bloody repression by the colonial army aided by civilian vigilantes. Brought to trial in October, 1948, most of the M.D.R.M. leaders were sentenced to prison or exiled and the party dissolved. The P.A.D.E.S.M., however, proved completely incapable of developing any national cohesion, and rapidly dissolved into competitive local sections. In this political vacuum, the small Malagasy section of the French Communist party made notable progress, primarily in the trade union movement. Malagasies owe their freedom from a serious Communist problem to the missions (primarily the Catholics, who succeeded in splitting the Communist-led labor movement) rather than to the colonial authorities who lacked political finesse and popular trust.

THE PARTI SOCIAL DÉMOCRATE

It was not until 1956, when, under a Socialist Minister of Overseas France, France granted substantial internal autonomy to its overseas possessions, that political life was resumed and a serious political movement based on something other than Hova leadership emerged. With the direct help of the French Socialist party, the Tsimehety schoolmaster, Philibert Tsiranana, founded the *Parti Social Démocrate* (P.S.D.) which today rules the Malagasy Republic. Under Tsiranana's leadership, the P.S.D. has followed a conscious policy of national reconciliation and unification.

The French Socialists' greater emphasis on "equality and independence of the individual" as opposed to the idea of sacrificing all for immediate national independence, appealed particularly to Madagascar's disadvantaged population groups. To the party's primarily coastal base of support, Tsiranana has added members of the Merina middle and lower

castes and some of the Hova intellectuals. After the Republic's independence in 1960, President Tsiranana declared a general amnesty for political prisoners and permitted the exiles to return to Madagascar. Today the P.S.D. and its affiliates control some 90 of the 107 seats in the Malagasy National Assembly.

Against the P.S.D., the major opposition party, the A.K.F.M. (the initials stand for Madagascar Congress and Independence Party in the Malagasy language), represents primarily the Hova-intellectual liaison that earlier led the opposition to colonial rule. The A.K.F.M.'s support comes primarily from Tananarive.⁵ Where the P.S.D. has sought close cooperation with the French and has encouraged private enterprise, the A.K.F.M. has advocated a more independent and neutralist foreign policy and has demanded rapid nationalization and collectivization of the economy. The opposition between the two parties recalls similar conflict in other former French colonies where the party backed by the colonial regime remained in power after independence.

DOMESTIC POLITICS

In addition to the range of difficulties common to underdeveloped countries, President Tsiranana's government has had to deal with the problems of reinforcing unity at home and establishing an independent national identity in world affairs. In the domestic sphere, the government has sought to promote rapid economic development while maintaining the political status quo. So far its success has been more apparent in the second than in the first of these goals. President Tsiranana's political abilities and the support he has enjoyed from the French government have allowed the P.S.D. to put together a skillfully balanced cabinet that includes representatives from all important interests on the island. Crucial to Tsiranana's success has been his appointment of Jacques Rabemananjara, one of the most prestigious of the M.D.R.M. leaders exiled after the 1947 revolt, as Minister for the National Economy. Although of Betsimisaraka origin, his past activities and his fame as a poet and historian have won him

⁵ For a summary of political party activity, see Raymond K. Kent, "Madagascar Emerges from Isolation," *Africa Report*, VII, 8 (Aug., 1962) pp. 3-8.

wide support among the Hova and other Merina. The balance of interests is so finely calculated within the government that President Tsiranana has avoided making significant personnel shifts since independence.

The P.S.D.'s dominant position has been strengthened by division and bickering in the opposition parties. Most recently, in March, 1963, Joseph Raseta, one of the former exiles, broke with the A.K.F.M. to found his own splinter party. When opposition activity seems serious, the government has on occasion taken firm steps. The combined opposition lists presented for the September, 1963, senatorial elections in Tananarive and Tuléar were outlawed for "irregularities."

The apparent political stability of the Malagasy Republic does not mean that the old social and economic divisions have been completely submerged. Many of the most bitter disputes within the government concern the conflicting interests of the plateau and the coast. The deputy who announced to the national assembly that the appointment of additional Tananarive representatives to the finance commission would "continue the historic subjection of the coastal peoples" was not just indulging in empty political hyperbole. However, the mere fact that such discussions go on *within* the governing party, and not only among parties, is a promising sign for continued political stability.

ECONOMIC DISPARITIES

The P.S.D. officially gives "primacy to the economic over the political realm" as a focus for governmental concern and action. The government has explicitly sought to submerge the economic and social discrepancies between the Merina plateau and the coastal regions in a program of rapid economic development. While it is as yet too early to judge the program's success, a few statistics give some appreciation of the advantages the Merina plateau enjoys at present. Although it covers only about nine per cent of the island, the province of Tananarive (essentially Imerina) produces about one-third of Madagascar's

gross national product and contains some twenty-three per cent of the population. With an intensive system of rice cultivation producing two crops a year, the province is exceptionally well-nourished. Despite this agricultural abundance, only some 43 per cent of the population engage in agriculture, while almost as high a proportion are in white collar or service professions.

Almost three-quarters of school-age children are in school in the Tananarive province. Over 60 per cent of the population are literate in Malagasy and nearly half understand French. This contrasts with a school attendance rate for the island as a whole of 48 per cent, while only 41 per cent are literate in Malagasy and 18 per cent understand French. The vast majority of Madagascar's professionals are Merina from Tananarive. As a result of both the province's prosperity and the dynamism of Merina society, the Merina population is growing at a rate of three per cent per annum as against two per cent for all the Malagasies.

At the other extreme, the Bara, a herding people from the southern coastal area, live in a food-deficit economy, send fewer than ten per cent of their children to school, and are increasing in number at a mere .7 per cent per annum.⁶

In attacking these regional disparities, the government has given priority to agricultural development in the less favored coastal areas and has promoted rapid expansion of the export sector of the economy, since about 95 per cent of Madagascar's exports come from non-Merina areas. Despite some encouraging starts and a few local successes, the agricultural development program has made only limited headway on the coast. Major impediments have been the lack of internal communication lines which hinders the extension of the market economy, and, above all, the persistence of economically irrational social and religious customs. Chief among these latter are a prevalence of religious celebrations connected with the cult of the dead which, like the celebrations in some Latin countries, are frequent enough to reduce the

⁶ Isnard, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-39.

work effort to a minimum necessary for subsistence. Other culturally induced unecological practices like indiscriminate cattle breeding and overgrazing, and the use of brush fires to clear land, continue to destroy productive lands faster than they can be reclaimed or improved. Finally, despite some earnest attempts at decentralization, the administration of agricultural development has continued to make the Tananarive bureaucracy the source and partially the beneficiary of agricultural development funds.

Expansion of exports, particularly coffee, vanilla and cloves, has been more successful; their yearly value has increased from some \$64 million in 1957 to some \$93 million in 1962. Until now the effects of increased export prosperity have not been greatly felt by the coastal peoples because most export production and virtually all export-import commerce are still owned and controlled by foreign groups. Some 85 per cent of Madagascar's private employers are drawn from the country's foreign community of 52,000 Europeans, 13,000 Indians, and 9,000 Chinese, and most of the Malagasy employers are Merina. Virtually all the marketing arrangements for Madagascar's exports are in the hands of a few closely-linked French trading, banking, and transportation organizations.⁷

Because of the Malagasy economy's need for foreign earnings and the country's lack of indigenous commercial élites, the Malagasy government has not attempted to change the commercial structure. As President Tsiranana declared in September, 1963, "I do not believe in destroying anything without knowing how, and with what, one can reconstruct."

RELATIONSHIP TO FRANCE

This statement might well be taken as the

⁷ A good, if opinionated, analysis of Madagascar's economy is to be found in René Gendarme, *L'Economie de Madagascar* (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1960). See especially his diagram of links between trading companies, pp. 138-39.

⁸ The writer recalls hearing President Tsiranana open a discussion of his country's recent history with the phrase, "When the French brought civilization to us. . . ." Unusual words for the leader of a new nation with a proud past.

Malagasy government's watchword on all matters concerning political and economic relations with France. To a degree exceptional even among the members of France's former African empire, Madagascar has retained and, in many ways, strengthened its relationship to its former *metropole*. At a time when "neo-colonialism" is a popular rallying cry throughout the underdeveloped world, President Tsiranana has not hesitated to pay public homage to France's aid and friendship and to encourage increased French participation in Madagascar's economy.⁸ France at the present time buys about 55 per cent of Malagasy exports and provides about 76 per cent of its imports. The Malagasy franc is backed by French reserves and issued by a French-controlled bank.

But Franco-Malagasy relations are far more than just economic. By recent law, French citizens (as well as citizens of most of the former French colonial empire) who have rendered notable service to the Malagasy Republic are eligible to vote and run for most offices in Malagasy elections. When the ruling P.S.D. party convened a party conference in 1963, it did so with the aid and participation of the French Socialist Party. Malagasy votes in the United Nations have seldom deviated from those of France on matters of direct French concern.

Although the government is frequently attacked by the A.K.F.M. opposition for its close relationship to France, the anti-French feeling that erupted in violence in Madagascar's colonial period seems much weaker, even among the Hova and the usually more volatile younger élites. A study of overseas students in French universities reveals that on almost every subject investigated the Malagasy students consider themselves closer to the French, better liked by the French, and with a much more favorable opinion of France, than do the

(Continued on page 180)

William J. Foltz is the writer of several articles on French-speaking Africa. He is the co-editor of *Nation-Building*, and is now at work on a new book on the Mali Federation.

Discussing the much publicized breach between Baganda and non-Baganda in Uganda, this author points out that "the re-incorporation of Buganda into Uganda became the principal object of practically all major political moves over the past decade."

Uganda: The Politics of Compromise

By TERENCE KILBOURNE HOPKINS

Assistant Professor of Sociology, Columbia University

DR. MILTON OBOTE, Uganda's astute Prime Minister, implied recently that he would shortly lead the country toward a one-party state. Not long before that, on October 9, 1963, the first anniversary of Uganda's independence from Great Britain, the most powerful of the country's traditional rulers, His Highness Sir Edward Frederick Mutesa II, Kabaka of Buganda, replaced Her Majesty Elizabeth II, Queen of England, as Uganda's head of state and became, in addition to His Highness, His Excellency the President of Uganda.

These two developments led some observers to infer that Uganda politics were reassuming, after a brief spell of predictability, the complex and unstable patterns they had exhibited in the late 1950's. On the surface, Uganda's politics are indeed complex. But they are probably no more baffling than those of any other country.

At the center of Uganda politics lies the Buganda Question, the core of which can be simply put: what place should the Kingdom of Buganda and its people, the Baganda, occupy in the emerging national society?¹ To most Baganda, they are an elite tribe, endowed with superior culture, economic

wealth, and political traditions. To most non-Baganda, such claims are pretentious, the wealth not wholly deserved, and the traditions a liability. With few exceptions they are no more prepared to put up with Baganda overrule than they were with British overrule.

The roots of the tension lie deep in Uganda's history. The area encompassed by modern Uganda contains two very different kinds of tribes. In the northern third, bordering Congo on the west, Sudan on the north, and Kenya on the east, are Nilotic-speaking tribes, the largest of which are the Iteso, Langi, Acholi and Lugbara. In the southern portion are Bantu-speaking tribes. The largest of these are, in the southeast near Kenya, the Basoga and Bagisu; in the south-central area on the shores of Lake Victoria, the Baganda; and in the southwest and west, just above Tanganyika and Rwanda and adjacent to Congo, the Banyankole, Bakiga, Batoro and Banyoro.

When the British appeared in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Baganda were in an expansionist phase and enjoyed a very well-organized administration. They saw in British power a means of securing and possibly furthering their gains. The British in turn saw in the Baganda armies and administration a means of extending their rule throughout what was shortly to become the Protectorate of Uganda. The two made common cause.

¹ In the Bantu languages in Uganda, the prefix *Bu-* designates the land or area of a tribe, the prefix *Ba-* the people severally, the prefix *Mu-* one person, the prefix *Lu-* (or *Ru-*) the language, and the prefix *Ki-* the adjective. Thus, most Baganda live in Buganda, speak Luganda, and enjoy Kiganda beer.

By the beginning of World War I, when the present boundaries of the country were fairly well established, most areas were under one or another form of British rule, thanks largely to their Baganda collaborators, who not only helped pacify reluctant tribes but also set up and manned the local administrative systems through which order was maintained, taxes collected, roads built, and cash crops introduced.

Gradually, as mission-educated sons from within an area became available, the Baganda were withdrawn and their phase as collaborators in colonialism came to end. But it left in the minds of Baganda and non-Baganda alike certain attitudes regarding one another which still permeate Uganda society.

British colonial policy contributed to this considerably as it very much favored Buganda. The capital of the Protectorate, Entebbe, and even more important, the commercial center, Kampala, arose within Buganda's geographical boundaries, meaning that all major lines of communication and transportation radiate from Buganda. Missionaries first set about their tasks there, with the result that formal education began earlier and became more extensive in Buganda. In addition, practically all efforts to develop cash-crop farming were concentrated in Buganda and in the area east of it (the Eastern Province, adjacent to Kenya).

These developments sustained the sense of superiority felt by the Baganda. The difference in wealth between them and other Ugandans is easily summarized: in Buganda today the cash income per head is about twice that in the Eastern Region and four times that in the Western and Northern Regions. Other differences are less easy to summarize but similar: Baganda are better educated, more numerous among professionals and upper civil servants, more active in trade, more likely to be found in the country's 220-odd small towns and trading centers, more of which are located in Buganda. But whereas most Baganda believe these differences justify all their claims to leadership, most non-Baganda believe they justify new policies to redress the imbalance.

In the early 1950's, when the Kabaka of Buganda and his ministers turned their thoughts to independence, they sought the end of colonialism not for Uganda as a whole but just for Buganda, the only part of the Protectorate they deemed ready. As an interim arrangement, they proposed the transfer of Buganda affairs from Her Majesty's Colonial Office to Her Majesty's Foreign Office. The moves were rebuffed by the British but not before they had further divided Baganda and non-Baganda.

Thus, the healing of this breach, and the re-incorporation of Buganda into Uganda, became the principal object of practically all major political moves over the past decade.

The British government's response to Buganda's proposal for a separate and foreseeable independence was to insist the Protectorate be kept together and to require the Kabaka's support. This he refused and in the fall of 1953, he was summarily deported. It is a minor irony of Uganda's brief national history that the deportation of the Kabaka, for insisting upon Buganda's separate independence, should have brought about the first healing of the breach which this very insistence had furthered. Moreover, since the affair intimately concerned the Baganda and they became more involved than anyone else in the negotiations to secure the return of the Kabaka, it effectively put the Baganda in the forefront of the nationalist movement.

Following the return of the Kabaka in 1955, the dominant role of the Baganda in the nationalist movement came under attack, and the principal party, the Uganda National Congress (U.N.C.), which several Baganda and a few Northerners had founded in 1952, splintered in 1959. A year earlier, nationalists mainly from the Western Province and some from the Eastern Province had formed the Uganda People's Union, and in 1960 they merged with the wing of U.N.C. led by the present Prime Minister, Milton Obote (a Lango, or Northerner), and formed the Uganda People's Congress (U.P.C.), the present ruling party. U.P.C.'s most striking characteristic at the time was the virtual absence of Baganda members.

With the return of the Kabaka in 1955, the common front among the Baganda politicians split badly as they jockeyed for position. And here another of the principal axes of Uganda politics came into play: Catholic-Protestant tensions. The basic point of these tensions may be simply stated: Anglicanism virtually became, first in Buganda and subsequently throughout the Protectorate, the established religion, and appointments to the administrative chieftainships were to a very large extent governed by religious considerations. In consequence, the normal competition between missionaries became a continuing struggle for power among their adherents. In 1956, a group of leading Catholic Baganda took a new tack and formed the Democratic Party (D.P.), which soon became a national party. The hierarchy of the Catholic Church, seeing in D.P.'s formation something akin to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe, used the Church's organization to further its spread, while the leading Catholics in other districts saw the new party as a means of securing a fairer share of administrative posts.

In 1961, direct elections were held throughout the country. Earlier, the British government had again rejected renewed Buganda claims for development as a separate state, and the Kabaka and his advisors decided to boycott the elections. By this time it was evident that Uganda could only secure its independence through a coalition between the Kabaka and his followers, on the one hand, and leading non-Baganda nationalists, on the other. Meanwhile the U.P.C. leaders decided to contest the elections in Buganda. The boycott, it is estimated, was 97 per cent effective, which gives some indication of the control the Kabaka can exercise through his administrative system, but the 3 per cent who did vote voted overwhelmingly for the D.P. candidates, which gave that party 20 of the 21 Buganda seats in the national legislature. These, together with the 23 (out of 61) which they won outside of Buganda, permitted them to organize the first democratically elected government in Uganda.

It was to be a short-lived government, however. A conference, held shortly afterward

in London, decided that new elections would occur in April, 1962, and that Uganda would become independent six months later. Buganda's place in the new state was a difficult issue. A plan was evolved between U.P.C. leaders and several of the leading younger Baganda, including of course the Kabaka. Constitutionally, it was agreed that Buganda was to stand in a federal relationship to the national state, which meant, among other things, that its own legislature was to decide whether Buganda's representatives to the national legislature were to be directly elected or elected indirectly by its own legislature. Politically, it now appears the following was agreed upon. U.P.C. would not contest the coming election for Buganda's own legislature; instead, a new group would be formed under the aegis of the Kabaka. On the strength of the showing in the boycott, this group could count on winning this election, after which the newly elected Buganda legislature would opt for indirect elections to the national legislature. The 21 Buganda representatives would then form with the U.P.C. representatives a coalition government in which Obote would be the Prime Minister and the Baganda would hold several ministries. Then, in the following year, the Kabaka would replace the Queen as Uganda's head of state.

The plan was apparently well-conceived, for in the elections for the Buganda legislature, a new group, called Kabaka Yekka (K.Y.), which combined rather disparate elements among Buganda's political factions, soundly defeated D.P. by winning 65 of the 68 elected seats and then chose Buganda's 21 representatives to the national legislature. Two months later, U.P.C. won 37 of the seats outside of Buganda (to D.P.'s 24) and with K.Y. formed a coalition government headed by Obote. Then, 18 months later, on the first anniversary of Uganda's independence, the Kabaka succeeded the Queen as Uganda's head of state.

The agreement worked out in the 1961 London conference did no more than it was intended to do, however. It was not intended to resolve the Buganda Question but

only to permit the struggle to be carried on within an independent Uganda; and that struggle has indeed continued.

It appears first and most obviously in disputes between the Buganda government and the Uganda government over interpretations of their respective legal powers. The struggle between the Baganda and non-Baganda also goes on within the structure of the U.P.C.-K.Y. ruling alliance, although here the developments in the past 18 months have increased U.P.C.'s strength and point towards the eventual demise of K.Y. The election of the Kabaka to the Presidency of Uganda has further weakened K.Y., although it has strengthened the overall position of the Baganda.

A third arena in which the struggle between Baganda and non-Baganda occurs is formed by what may be called the leading circles of Uganda politics. Since Uganda's independence, three key figures have stood out: from the Northern Region, Dr. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda and President of U.P.C.; from Buganda, Sir Edward Frederick Mutesa II, Kabaka of Buganda, chief voice in K.Y. and Uganda President; and from the Eastern Region, Sir William Wilberforce Nadiope, Vice-President of Uganda, formerly Minister of Internal Affairs in Obote's government, the traditional ruler (Kyabazinga) of Busoga, and a prominent and powerful member of the U.P.C. Executive. No one from the Western Region quite approaches these three in power: each has a very sizeable well-organized local following, considerable impact on national policies and several followers distributed among the important decision-making groups.

The principal contender for the Presidency of Uganda at first appeared to be Nadiope. His election, however, would have suggested to the hypersensitive Baganda that national positions were closed to them and the cleavage between Baganda and non-Baganda would have deepened. On the other hand, Obote could throw his support to the Kabaka only if certain conditions obtained. For although the Presidency is mainly honorific, it has certain emergency powers in the event

of a government crisis and its occupant is ex-officio head of the armed forces. Thus, U.P.C. had to be firmly in control of the government, which it appears to be; Obote himself had to be firmly in control of U.P.C. which he appears to be; and in the event of a serious policy difference between himself and the Kabaka, he had to be able to count on the support of the army and the police, which it appears he can.

These conditions being met, and the London agreement having been made, Obote threw all his weight behind the Kabaka's election to the Presidency. Thus, without altering basically the alignment of forces, the Baganda were incorporated still further into the developing state, and in a way almost calculated to enhance their attachment to Uganda—for the Presidency, in matters of protocol, takes precedence over the Prime Ministership.

A fourth arena in which the Buganda Question expresses itself is constituted by the organized interest groups, two of which warrant particular attention, the national civil service and the armed forces (army and police).

Not until independence was in the offing in 1960–1961, did Africanization of the higher civil service positions begin in earnest. By that time non-Baganda were available in large enough numbers to challenge the virtual Baganda monopoly and they had the backing of the powerful U.P.C. Given the prevalence of Baganda and their seniority, any attempt to make the civil service more representative meant promoting non-Baganda who in civil service terms might be less deserving. It is hardly surprising that the Baganda came to see the Africanization program as an attack on them; to some extent, they were right. Obtaining no satisfaction, even through their Public Employee's Union, the Baganda middle and upper level civil servants became increasingly alienated from their work.

What seems to have prevented the process from going further was the election of the Kabaka to the presidency. With this leading figure of their tribe in a key position, the discontent of the Baganda has lessened.

The Uganda Rifles (the army) and the Uganda Police stand in marked contrast to the civil service, for they are dominated not by Baganda, but by men from the northern Nilotic-speaking tribes which suggests the likelihood of their automatic support for Obote in any conflict with the Kabaka. To the Baganda, and to some other Bantu peoples, the overwhelming number of northerners in the armed forces appears to constitute a distinct threat. How justified their fears are is difficult to say, but Bantu peoples have begun encouraging their young men to join the army and police to help strike a better balance.

It is difficult to assess the morale and discipline of these two forces. As in Tanganyika and Kenya, army units mutinied recently in order to secure higher pay and other benefits, and it remains unclear whether their success will feed their ambition or salve it. Also, the army is continually kept busy but in a way that may prove frustrating and lead to difficulties. Refugees from Rwanda, to the south of Uganda, but now living on the Uganda border, often engage in hit and run attacks on their homeland which provoke retaliation; and the Uganda Rifles on several occasions have had to patrol the border. In the north, other across-the-border raids have required their attention. And in one district in Uganda, the Kingdom of Toro, where a portion of the population is attempting to secede and form a separate district, or failing that, to join the Congo, special detachments of police and companies of the Uganda Rifles have had to keep order. In all these cases, skirmishes occur, men are wounded, on occasion killed; yet there is no enemy who can be properly defeated. Morale in such cases is not likely to remain high.

Furthermore, as the low proportion of Bantu in the armed forces would suggest, service in the army or police is not considered a particularly worthy occupation. A situation in which those with power are looked down upon is not particularly stable and calls for a resolution.

Other organized interest groups can be touched upon more briefly. Uganda, as was mentioned, has been somewhat of a battle-

ground between Catholic and Protestant missions, and this tension has always had a highly political character. With the Catholic Church supporting the D.P., the Anglican Church came of course to support U.P.C. However, even before the 1962 elections the Catholic Church openly deplored the virtual equivalence of church membership and political party preference. During the election, the U.P.C. argued for the separation of party vote from church membership; later the two parties and the two churches called for the withdrawal of religious groups as such from participation in politics.

To a large extent, these tensions have died down, but one of the more important policies of the government could awaken them. Initially in Uganda all education was in the hands of the missions, and although government came to play an increasing role in financing and in introducing curricular reforms, practically all of the elementary schools and many of the high schools were still under mission control at the time of independence.

Shortly after the elections, Dr. Luyimbazi-Zake, the Minister of Education, raised publicly the issue of secularization. As anticipated, his trial balloon drew fire. But in due course the Anglicans realized that they had less to lose than the Catholics. With several of the larger Anglican guns muffled, the government launched a program of secularization in August, 1963. Apparently the plan will move slowly, but unless D.P., which has tried to divest itself of its close association with the Catholic Church, decides to make the program a political issue, it will probably proceed with a minimum of difficulty.

In many developing countries, organized labor plays an important political role, usually through its place in the structure of the dominant party. But in Uganda, it does not. Several reasons may account for this, but the principal one is probably that the Uganda labor movement is still dominated by Kenyans who, as such, have only a slight voice in Uganda politics. This situation may change as Ugandans play that larger role in Uganda labor organizations which they are now beginning to demand.

Today, small-scale, cash-crop farming, mainly of cotton and coffee, is the backbone of the monetarized sector of Uganda's economy. The export of these two products accounts for over 80 per cent of Uganda's earned income from overseas. Estate production contributes only about one per cent of the coffee and none of the cotton. At present, about three times as much land is devoted to cotton as to coffee, but in recent years coffee has accounted for a much larger proportion of Uganda's export revenues.

Uganda, like other East African countries, has a vocal, organized community of Asians (Indo-Pakistanis) who until quite recently had a virtual monopoly on retail trade and shared with the British control of wholesale trade, although in numbers they constitute no more than one per cent of the approximately 7,000,000 people. Also until recently, they have been the sole produce buyers and have owned all existing processing plants in Uganda. In a country where cash is largely obtained through the sale of produce, Asians have held a powerful position.

Initially, their control of the distributive sector of the economy was encouraged by the British administration, but toward the end of their rule they began to concern themselves with schemes designed to break the Asians' near monopoly, and these have been continued since independence. The two most important are the development of producer cooperatives and the Africanization of retail trade.

Communal feelings are strong, most Africans having at best ambivalent feelings toward Asians and most Asians having at best ambivalent feelings toward even the idea of a multi-racial society. Economically better off, claiming a superior status the Africans are unprepared to grant, virtually lacking in political power, and exercising a highly visible, but in African eyes illegitimate, control over the economy, Uganda's Asians occupy an exceedingly vulnerable position in the emerging society.

Although chiefly agricultural, Uganda's economy is by no means without industrial development. A number of industrial enter-

prises have been started in the past decade, including a textile mill, a cement factory, and a fertilizer plant. Also there are produce processing works, breweries, soap factories, small furniture makers and bottling works. In 1956, a copper mine was opened up in the Western Region (Toro District) and now produces Uganda's third most valuable export, although it may soon be depleted. Other projects are on the planning boards, and most recently the government has constructed a television station.

Uganda's prospects for economic growth are generally judged to be good, and it seems likely that the fairly steady improvement in the level of living can be continued. This promises well for the stability of the government, but it remains true that Uganda, like most other developing countries, is industrializing *after* the franchise has been extended to the farming and working classes rather than *before*, as most Western countries and Japan did. The government therefore has less leeway to pursue policies evidently against the short-run interest of these voters. However, the presence of an opposition party is not alone in causing the U.P.C. leaders to consider working towards a one-party system. The concept of African socialism plays an important part in their thinking, and the countries they associate with that concept are one-party states.

Here again, the Buganda Question reappears, for it is most unlikely that non-U.P.C. Baganda would acquiesce in such a development. Tactically it would be an error, since the existence of opposition parties gives them more room to maneuver than would a U.P.C. constituted one-party state. Ideologically it would support a basic attack on the legitimacy of the Kabaka, since few proponents of African socialism accord much scope to traditional rulers. Consequently,

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Terence Kilbourne Hopkins took his Ph.D. at Columbia. In 1961-1962, and the summer of 1963, he researched in the Ankole District of Uganda on political and economic development there during the colonial overrule.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PROPHET OUTCAST: TROTSKY, 1929-1940. BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 543 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.50.)

This third and concluding volume of Isaac Deutscher's brilliant biography of Leon Trotsky is a study of the decline and demise of one of the historic figures of the twentieth century. It opens with Trotsky's banishment from Russia and concludes with his assassination in Mexico in August, 1940. The intervening years are fraught with personal tragedy and political defeat for Trotsky. Throughout, the spirit, the intellect and the dynamism of this extraordinary political thinker and leader are superbly conveyed. Deutscher, an active and intimate participant in the anti-Stalinist Communist struggles of the 1930's, and a friend of Trotsky's, has had access to Trotsky's personal files, which are housed at Harvard University. The result is a highly personal, yet primarily political, account of Trotsky's years of exile in Turkey, his quest for asylum in France, in Norway and in Mexico, his efforts to maintain contact with anti-Stalin groups in Russia, and his quixotic attempt to establish a new international Communist organization, to rival the Comintern.

Trotsky's "ideas, writings, struggles, and wanderings" are presented with passion and sensitivity. Deutscher emphasizes that "to the end Trotsky's strength and weakness alike were rooted in classical Marxism. His defeats epitomized the basic predicament by which classical Marxism was beset as doctrine and movement—the discrepancy and the divorce between the Marxist vision of revolutionary development and the actual course of class struggle and revolution."

Deutscher's trilogy is one of the great biographies of our time.

POLITICS IN SOUTHERN ASIA. EDITED BY SAUL ROSE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963. 386 pages and index, \$10.00).

This book is the result of a symposium on the subject of "The Political Evolution of South and Southeast Asia since Independence" which took place in 1961. As edited, the volume leads off with a general look at the region extending from Pakistan to the Philippines.

Among the countries subsequently examined are India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Malaya. The papers vary in length, scope, and value, a differentiation common to any symposium. The non-specialist can learn much from a reading of these interesting presentations; the specialist will have to be more selective.

If there is a criticism which may be leveled against the majority of the essays it is that they appear to devote inordinate attention to the politics and political maneuverings of the groups in power, and insufficient attention to the residual problems and opposition groups that could conceivably effect drastic realignment in the near future.

THE ELEPHANT. BY SLAWOMIR MROZEK. Translated from the Polish by Konrad Syrop. (New York: Grove Press, 1963. 176 pages, \$3.95.)

This collection of 42 brief pieces constitutes a literary mosaic of satire, fables and fantasies about life in contemporary Poland. Their significance lies in the fact that they were first published in Poland, a Communist country which apparently permits its writers to poke fun at its shortcomings. On a different level, these pieces also represent a biting attack against the entire system.

A.Z.R.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

President Johnson's Message on the State of the Union

On January 8, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave his 1964 State of the Union Message to the United States Congress. The full text of this address follows:

I will be brief—for our time is necessarily short and our agenda is already long.

Last year's congressional session was the longest in peacetime history. With that foundation, let us work together to make this year's session the best in history.

Let this session of Congress be known as the session which did more for civil rights than the last hundred sessions combined;

As the session which enacted the most far-reaching tax cut of our time;

As the session which declared all-out war on human poverty and unemployment in these United States;

As the session which finally recognized the health needs of all our older citizens;

As the session which reformed our tangled transportation and transit policies;

As the session which achieved the most effective, efficient foreign-aid program ever;

And as the session which helped to build more homes, more schools, more libraries, and more hospitals than any single session of Congress in our nation's history.

All this and more can and must be done.

It can be done by this summer.

And it can be done without any increase in spending. In fact, under the budget I shall shortly submit, it can be done with an actual reduction in federal expenditures and employment.

We have in 1964 a unique opportunity and obligation—to prove the success of our system—to disprove those cynics and critics at home and abroad who question our purpose and our competence.

If we fail—if we fritter and fumble away our opportunity in needless, senseless quarrels between Democrats and Republicans,

Or between the House and the Senate,

Or between the South and the North,

Or between Congress and the Administration—

Then history will rightfully judge us harshly.

But if we succeed—

If we can achieve these goals by forging in this country a greater sense of union—

Then, and only then, can we take full satisfaction in the state of the Union.

Here in the Congress, you can demonstrate effective legislative leadership by discharging the public business with clarity and dispatch—voting each important proposal up or voting it down but at least bringing it to a fair and final vote.

Let us carry forward the plans and programs of John Fitzgerald Kennedy—not because of our sorrow or sympathy—but because they are right.

In his memory, I especially ask all members of my own political faith—in this election year—to put country ahead of party, and to debate principles, not personalities.

For my part, I pledge a progressive administration which is efficient, honest, and frugal.

The budget to be submitted shortly is in full accord with this pledge.

It will cut our deficit in half, from \$10 billion to \$4.9 billion.

It will be, in proportion to our national output, the smallest budget since 1951.

It will call for a substantial reduction in federal employment, as yet accomplished only once before in the last 10 years.

While maintaining the full strength of our combat defenses, it will call for the lowest number of civilian personnel in the Department of Defense since 1950.

It will call for total expenditures of \$97.9 billion—compared to \$98.4 for the current year, a reduction of more than \$500 million.

It will call for new obligational authority of \$103.8 billion—a reduction of more than \$4 billion below last year's request of \$107.9 billion.

But it is not a stand-still budget—for America cannot afford to stand still. Our population is growing. Our economy is more complex. Our people's needs are expanding.

By closing down obsolete installations—

By curtailing less urgent programs—

By cutting back where cutting back is wise—

By insisting on a dollar's worth for a dollar spent—

I am able to recommend in this reduced budget the most federal support in history for education, for health, for retraining the unemployed, and for helping the economically and physically handicapped.

This budget—and this year's legislative program—are designed to help each and every American citizen fulfill his basic hopes:

His hopes for a fair chance to make good;

His hopes for fair play from the law;

His hopes for a full-time job on full-time pay;

His hopes for a decent home for his family in a decent community;

His hopes for a good school for his children with good teachers;

And his hopes for security when faced with sickness, unemployment, or old age.

Unfortunately, many Americans live on the outskirts of hope—some because of their poverty, some because of their color, and all too many because of both.

Our task is to help replace their despair with opportunity.

This administration here and now declares unconditional war on poverty in America. I urge this Congress and all Americans to join with me in that effort.

It will not be a short or easy struggle—no single weapon or strategy will suffice—but we shall not rest until that war is won.

The richest nation on earth can afford to win it.

We cannot afford to lose it.

A thousand dollars invested in salvaging an unemployable youth today can return \$40,000 more in his lifetime.

Poverty is a national problem, requiring improved national organization and support. But this attack, to be effective, must also be organized at the state and local level and supported by state and local efforts.

For the war against poverty will not be won in Washington. It must be won in the field—in every private home and every public office, from the courthouse to the White House.

The program I shall propose will emphasize this cooperative approach to help that one-fifth of all American families with incomes too small to meet their basic needs.

Our chief weapons in a more pinpointed attack will be better schools, better health, better homes, better training, and better job opportunities to help more Americans—especially young Americans—escape from squalor and misery and unemployment.

Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the symptom.

The cause may lie deeper—in our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities—in a lack of education and training, a lack of medical care and housing, a lack of decent communities in which to live and bring up children.

Whatever the cause, our joint federal-local effort must pursue poverty wherever it exists—

In city slums and small towns,

In sharecropper shacks,

In migrant-worker camps,

And on Indian reservations,

Among whites as well as Negroes,

Among the young as well as the aged,

In boom towns and depressed areas.

Our aim is not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty but to cure it—and, above all, to prevent it.

No single piece of legislation, however, will suffice.

We must launch a special effort in the chronically distressed areas of Appalachia.

We must expand our small but successful area redevelopment program.

We must enact youth-employment legislation to put jobless, aimless, hopeless youngsters to work on useful projects.

We must distribute more food to the needy through a broader food-stamp program.

We must create a national service corps to help the economically handicapped of our own country as the Peace Corps helps those abroad.

We must modernize our unemployment insurance and establish a high-level commission on automation. If we have the brainpower to invent these machines, we have the brainpower to make certain they are a boon and not a bane to humanity.

We must extend the coverage of our minimum wage laws to more than 2 million workers now lacking this basic protection of purchasing power.

We must, by including special school-aid funds as part of our education program, improve the quality of teaching, training, and counseling in our hardest-hit areas.

We must build more libraries in every area—and more hospitals and nursing homes under the Hill-Burton Act—and train more nurses to staff them.

We must provide hospital insurance for our older citizens, financed by every worker and his employer under social security contributing no more than a \$1 a month during the employee's working career to protect him in his old age in a dignified manner, without cost to the Treasury, against the devastating hardship of prolonged or repeated illness.

We must, as part of a revised housing and urban-renewal program, give more help to those displaced by slum clearance, provide more housing for our

poor and our elderly, and seek as our ultimate goal in our free enterprise system a decent home for every American family.

We must help obtain more modern mass transit within our communities as well as low-cost transportation between them.

Above all, we must release \$11 billion of tax reduction into the private spending stream to create new jobs and new markets in every area.

These programs are obviously not for the poor or under-privileged alone.

Every American family will benefit by the extension of social security to cover the hospital costs of their aged parents.

Every American community will benefit from the construction or modernization of schools, libraries, hospitals and nursing homes—from the training of more nurses—and from the improvement of urban renewal and public transit.

And every American taxpayer, corporate or individual, will benefit from the earliest possible passage of the pending tax bill—from both the new investment it will bring and the new jobs it will create.

That tax bill has been thoroughly discussed for a year. Now we need action.

The new budget clearly allows it.

Our taxpayers surely deserve it.

Our economy strongly demands it.

Every month of delay dilutes its benefits in 1964 for consumption, investment, and employment.

For until the bill is signed, its investment incentives cannot be deemed certain, and the withholding rate cannot be reduced—and it should now be reduced to 14 percent instead of 15 percent. I, therefore, urge the Congress to take final action on this bill by the first of February.

For however proud we may be of the unprecedented progress of our free-enterprise economy over the last three years, we cannot permit it to pause.

In 1963, for the first time in history, we crossed the 70 million job mark—but we will soon need more than 75 million.

In 1963, our gross national product reached the \$600 billion level—\$100 billion higher than when we took office. But it easily could and should be still \$30 billion higher today.

Wages, profits, and family income are also at their highest levels in history, but four million workers and 13 percent of our industrial capacity are still idle.

We need a tax cut now to keep this country moving.

For our goal is not merely to spread the work. Our goal is to create more jobs.

I believe the enactment of a 35-hour week would sharply increase costs, invite inflation, impair our ability to compete, and merely share instead of creating employment.

But I am equally opposed to the 45- or 50-hour

week in those industries where consistently excessive use of overtime causes increased unemployment.

I recommend . . . legislation authorizing the creation of tripartite industry committees to determine, on an industry-by-industry basis, as to where a higher penalty rate for overtime would increase job openings without unduly increasing costs—and authorizing the establishment of such higher rates.

Let me make one principle of this administration abundantly clear: All of these increased opportunities—in employment, education, housing, and every field—must be open to Americans of every color.

As far as the writ of federal law will run, we must abolish not some but all racial discrimination.

For this is not merely an economic issue—or a social, political or international issue. It is a moral issue, and it must be met by the passage this session of the bill now pending in the House.

All members of the public should have equal access to facilities open to the public.

All members of the public should be equally eligible for federal benefits financed by the public.

Members of the public should have an equal chance to vote for public officials and to send their children to good public schools and to contribute their talents to the public good.

Today Americans of all races stand side by side in Berlin and Vietnam.

They died side by side in Korea.

Surely they can work and eat and travel side by side in their own country.

We must also lift by legislation the bars of discrimination against those who seek entry into our country, particularly those with much-needed skills and those joining their families.

In establishing preferences, a nation built by the immigrants of all lands can ask those who now seek admission: "What can you do for our country?"

But we should not be asking: "In what country were you born?"

For our ultimate goal is a world without war, a world made safe for diversity, in which all men, goods, and ideas can freely move across every border and boundary.

We must advance toward this goal in 1964 in at least 10 different ways, not as partisans, but as patriots:

First, we must maintain—and our reduced defense budget will maintain—that margin of military safety and superiority obtained through three years of steadily increasing the quality and quantity of our strategic, conventional and anti-guerrilla forces.

In 1964 we will be better prepared than ever before to defend the cause of freedom, whether it

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SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 135)

their brothers in South Africa is a potent force. At the conference of Heads of African States and Governments in Addis Ababa in May, 1963, a Liberation Bureau was established to coordinate offers of military material, and "to dispense funds to aid the freedom fighters of Southern Africa." Leaders and refugees from South Africa are based in several African countries and many are active in lobbying, planning and training. Meanwhile within the United Nations the initiative of Scandinavian states has led to the setting up of a group of experts "to examine methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedom to all the inhabitants . . . regardless of colour, creed or race; and to consider what part the United Nations might play in the achievement of that end." It is 54 years since African leaders in Bloemfontein made an almost identical statement of objectives.

TANGANYIKA

(Continued from page 141)

for all East Africa could arrive simultaneously. With his usual foresight, he realised the dangers to the possibility of federation in the three territories taking their own divergent paths if they became separately independent. Indeed, one of the yardsticks in deciding on any government action has been Tanganyika's reluctance to prejudice either the existing or possible future links with Kenya and Uganda. Mention has been made of the delay over a one-party system, and the difficulties over new industry. In addition, Tanganyika has seriously curtailed her ability to pursue genuinely independent policies, particularly in the economic sphere, in order to stay within the East African Common Services Organisation, the Common Market and the Currency Board, whose benefits are at the most marginal to Tanganyika, although con-

siderable to Kenya. The country's leaders favour federation although, now, they would prefer no union to a federation not strong enough to spread economic benefits through a strong planning and tax machinery. Nyerere seems prepared to give up all thought of a key post for himself if his country can have the benefit of the federal capital.

FOREIGN POLICY

This dedication to the idea of federation is one example of the government's commitment to the ideals of Pan-African unity. Tanganyika's role in the Pan-African arena has become significant. Nyerere did useful groundwork behind the scenes in the recent Addis Ababa Conference of African heads of State, and his own speech there was one of the highlights of the conference. Tanganyika's growing importance on the African scene is in part due to her strategic position in relation to non-liberated Africa. Dar es Salaam has become the main refuge for nationalist movements from Southern Africa. Almost all of them are represented in the capital; many have their main headquarters there. They receive assistance and protection from the Tanganyika government—indeed the only occasion on which the country's 18-month-old Preventive Detention Act has been used was against three Southern Rhodesian "spies." The city has, consequently, become the headquarters of the Committee of Liberation consisting of nine countries appointed by the Addis Ababa meeting.

Recently, however, the work of the Committee, and especially Tanganyika's role in relation to the liberation movements, has come under fire from Ghana. This may be an indication of the rivalry between Tanganyika and Ghana in the context of Pan-African politics.

At the United Nations, too, Tanganyika's voice has been heard on African affairs, although, otherwise, she has not concerned herself with wider international issues. The number of Tanganyika's diplomatic representatives has been realistically limited to what she could reasonably afford. Her dealings with the outside world have been scrupu-

lously neutral, although almost no aid has yet been received from the East, probably because none has been offered.

Tanganyika's image as a stable and moderate (at least on issues other than colonialism) country is a little tarnished but still exists. But the moderation covers a certain toughness. However regrettable, this is probably necessary, given the enormous task of dragging up this desperately poor nation. The January, 1964, military mutiny tested Tanganyika's stability. A stable government, still retaining the confidence of the people, is essential.

However, the same situation about which Julius Nyerere complained early in 1962 when he resigned, that "the outside world says it has confidence in Tanganyika, but in reality has confidence in Nyerere," is still true, and is justifiable, on the whole. The future of the country probably depends in the short run on the continued guidance of this remarkable man, and in the long run, on whether the country can produce a new generation of leaders sharing his ideals.

THE RHODESIAS AND NYASALAND

(Continued from page 155)

benevolent eye on the present régime in Salisbury, and it is unlikely that a weak Nyasaland and a still dependent Northern Rhodesia would attempt any kind of direct intervention. With Britain sitting on the fence and the United Nations without any very obvious means of intervening further, Southern Rhodesia must be expected in the foreseeable future to be left largely to work out her own destiny.

With so varied a picture of the problems of the three territories, the chance that much of the concept of federation is likely to survive or be regenerated is slight. Of all the institutional links forged, only Central African Airways is to continue operating as a three-territory governmental organization, while the two Rhodesias have set up joint machinery for handling the airways and the Kariba hydro-electric scheme. By 1965, all the financial knots will have been loosened;

new currencies and new central banks will have been introduced. If by then an African majority is within striking distance of power in the south, a trend may again set in towards association.

Certainly there are enough economic factors entangling the territories—Nyasa labour in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the rail route to the coast from the Copperbelt through Southern Rhodesia, and the northern territories as markets for Southern Rhodesia's manufactures, to mention only these—to make some kind of *modus vivendi* essential. But without a basis of common political sympathy on the primary issue of majority rule, the prospect of a new federation is a cloud far smaller than a man's hand.

MALAGASY

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students of former French Africa.⁹ Since most of these students are Merina, these results indicate that Tsiranana may hope to enjoy continued support for his Francophile policies.

Aside from its close relationship with France, the Malagasy Republic's primary participation in international affairs has been through its membership in the African and Malagasy Union (U.A.M.). President Tsiranana's government has been one of the staunchest supporters of the group, which includes most of the members of France's former black African empire. A distinguished Malagasy, Jules Razafinbahiny, is the secretary-general of the U.A.M.'s division for economic cooperation.

Despite President Tsiranana's frequent exchanges of courtesy visits with French-speaking African heads of state, the Malagasies have continued to limit their commitments to the African continent. Trade with black Africa represents less than three per cent of Madagascar's foreign trade (slightly less than its trade with Asia), and the Malagasies have always insisted on the importance of the "M" in U.A.M. For many Malagasy leaders, participation in the U.A.M. would seem more a

⁹ See "Les Etudiants d'Outre-Mer en France," *Sondages*, XXIII, 3, (1961) pp. 51-74.

way of maintaining membership in a revamped form of the French sphere of influence than a direct commitment to a new African identity.

The Malagasy Republic's continued close involvement with France and its rejection of anti-colonialism as a unifying slogan inevitably are something of a gamble, albeit so far a successful one. Should continued French participation in the Malagasy economy not bring improvement in the lot of large numbers of Malagasies, Franco-Malagasy cooperation could easily become an emotionally charged political issue capable of hurting the present government and of rousing ethnic passions that lie under the surface of Malagasy political life. Avoidance of such a calamity will require not only economic advance, but also a continuation of the high level of political skill and restraint shown by the leaders of both the French and the Malagasy Republics.

UGANDA

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any serious one-party attempt by U.P.C. would in all likelihood meet strong resistance from the Baganda, and would thus jeopardize the framework so carefully built in the past three years.

FOREIGN POLICY

One of the really major changes that independence brings is in the character and extent of a country's relations with other countries. Under colonialism, Ugandans were distinctively British charges who were permitted access to few other countries. The coming of independence has changed all that. Uganda students have received scholarships from many countries; trade delegations have arrived from all over; leaders from various organizations have been invited to other countries and vice versa. Uganda, as a member of the Commonwealth, remains politically and economically affiliated with the West. Her exports and imports come mainly from other Commonwealth countries, and she receives most outside financial aid from Western countries. But she is slowly shifting away

from the kind of complete dependence a colonial economy implies.

Part of her expanding involvement in international affairs is taken up with specifically African affairs. Uganda has participated in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Tanganyika, the reorganized Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa, the negotiations for the establishment of the African development bank, and the Addis Ababa meetings, at which she became one of the countries constituting the African Liberation Bureau of the Organization for African Unity.

However, her closest relations are with the adjacent countries of Kenya and Tanganyika for these three states have a common market and monetary system. Through the East African Common Services Organization they jointly operate the railways, airlines, and harbors; collect customs, income and excise taxes; and engage in a variety of other activities including the compilation of economic statistics, the conduct of several kinds of research and the provision of meteorological information.

This has been a gradual association over a period of years. What has altered, however, are the prospects for a parallel political federation of the three states. Prior to Uganda's independence, meetings among the political leaders of the countries resulted in a declaration of intention to proceed with political federation as rapidly as possible. Then, in January, 1963, the Kabaka's government put itself on record as wishing to proceed slowly. A working committee consisting of representatives from each government got together during the year, but were unable to resolve a number of key issues. In November, 1963, a Kenya minister suggested that Kenya and Tanganyika should proceed without Uganda. This drew a retort from Obote so sharp that Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's Prime Minister, felt it necessary to state that the views expressed were the Minister's own and did not reflect the Kenya government's.

If Uganda has been rather more cautious than the others on the matter of federation, one reason for her behavior surely lies with the Baganda, who had demanded in their

legislature in September, 1963, that Buganda should be treated as a separate federal unit in any federation. Here again, the U.P.C. leadership has been faced with the Buganda Question: should they proceed with the federation and then cope with the Baganda as best they can, or should they cope with the Baganda first in order to proceed more rapidly later? As on previous occasions, they have acted to keep intact the basic framework within which Baganda and non-Baganda can carry on Uganda's politics and eventually make the Question itself irrelevant.

STATE OF THE UNION

(Continued from page 178)

is threatened by outright aggression or by the infiltration practiced by those in Hanoi and Havana who ship arms and men across international borders to foment insurrection. And we must continue to use that strength, as John Kennedy used it in the Cuba crisis and for the test-ban treaty, to demonstrate both the futility of nuclear war and the possibilities of lasting peace.

Second, we must take new steps—and we shall make new proposals at Geneva—toward the control and eventual abolition of arms.

Even in the absence of agreement we must not stockpile arms beyond our needs or seek an excess of military power that could be provocative as well as wasteful.

It is in this spirit that in this fiscal year we are cutting back our production of enriched uranium by 25 percent, shutting down four plutonium piles and closing many nonessential military installations. And it is in this spirit that we call on our adversaries to do the same.

Third, we must make increased use of our food as an instrument of peace, making it available—by sale, trade, loan, or donation—to hungry people in all nations which tell us of their needs and accept proper conditions of distribution.

Fourth, we must assure our pre-eminence in the peaceful exploration of outer space, focusing on an expedition to the moon in this decade—in cooperation with other powers if possible, alone if necessary.

Fifth, we must expand world trade. Having recognized in the act of 1962 that we must buy as well as sell, we now expect our trading partners to recognize that we must sell as well as buy. We are willing to give them competitive access to our market—asking only that they do the same for us.

Sixth, we must continue—through such measures as the interest equalization tax as well as the co-operation of other nations—our recent progress toward balancing our international accounts.

This administration must and will preserve the present gold value of the dollar.

Seventh, we must become better neighbors with the free states of the Americas, working with the councils of the O.A.S., with a stronger Alliance for Progress, and with all the men and women of this hemisphere who believe in liberty and justice for all.

Eighth, we must strengthen the ability of free nations everywhere to develop their independence and raise their standard of living and thereby frustrate those who prey on poverty and chaos.

To do this, the rich must help the poor, and we must do our part. We must achieve a more rigorous administration of our development assistance, with larger roles for private investors, for other industrialized nations, for international agencies and for the recipient nations themselves.

Ninth, we must strengthen our Atlantic and Pacific partnerships, maintain our alliances, and make the United Nations a more effective instrument for national independence and international order.

Tenth, and finally, we must develop with our allies new means of bridging the gap between East and West—facing danger boldly wherever danger exists—but being equally bold in our search for new agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all while violating the interests of none.

In short, we must be constantly prepared for the worst and constantly acting for the best—strong enough to win a war and wise enough to prevent one.

We shall neither act as aggressors nor tolerate acts of aggression.

We intend to bury no one, and we do not intend to be buried.

We can fight, if we must, as we have fought before—but we pray we will never have to fight again.

My fellow Americans: In these last seven sorrowful weeks, we have learned anew that nothing is so enduring as faith and nothing is so degrading as hate.

John Kennedy was a victim of hate, but he was also a builder of faith—faith in our fellow Americans, whatever their creed or color or station in life;

And faith in the future of man, whatever his divisions and differences.

This faith was echoed in all parts of the world. On every continent and in every land to which I traveled, I found faith and hope and love toward this land and all its people.

I ask you now, in the Congress and in the country, to join with me in expressing and fulfilling that faith—in working for a nation that is free from want and a world that is free from hate—a world of peace and justice, freedom and abundance, for our time and for all time to come.

*A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events
of January, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

The Month in Review

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND

Instructor of History, Ohio Northern University

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League, The

Jan. 13—The chiefs of state of 13 Arab nations meet in Cairo to formulate strategy opposing Israel's projected diversion of the waters of the Jordan River.

Jan. 17—The Arab League ends its conference without publicly disclosing any specific plan regarding Israel's irrigation project.

Disarmament

Jan. 21—The 17-nation disarmament conference resumes at Geneva. The U.S. offers to negotiate with the Soviet Union a "verified freeze" of the numbers and types of vehicles to deliver strategic nuclear weapons.

Jan. 28—Semyon K. Tsarapkin, the Soviet Union's representative at the Geneva meetings, proposes the destruction of all bombers.

European Economic Community (The Common Market)

Jan. 10—Executives of the European Coal and Steel Community decide to order their six member countries to raise tariffs on steel and foundry pig iron.

Jan. 23—At a ministerial meeting of the Western European Union, France rejects a British appeal for a voice in talks among the six Common Market countries that could lead eventually to political integration.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

(See also *Panama and U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

Jan. 10—The U.S. and Panama agree to let

the Inter-American Peace Committee use its good offices to settle the dispute over the Panama Canal.

Jan. 14—The U.S. notifies the O.A.S. Peace Committee that it is prepared to discuss "the whole range of outstanding issues" with Panama.

Jan. 16—Hope for agreement dims after Panama's President Roberto Chiari announces that before he resumes relations with the U.S. he wants assurance that the U.S. is willing to revise the Panama Canal treaties.

Jan. 25—A six-hour meeting of the Inter-American Peace Committee fails to produce a solution satisfactory to both Panama and the U.S. At issue is the Panamanian stand that before it negotiates with the U.S. directly it wishes an advance commitment on the writing of a new Canal treaty.

Jan. 28—The O.A.S. gives Cuba until February 5 to answer charges that she helped arm a Venezuelan terrorist campaign.

United Nations, The

Jan. 3—Secretary General U Thant reports to the Security Council "encouraging" progress toward ending the fighting in Yemen.

Jan. 13—U Thant names a group of international experts to examine the problem of South Africa's racial policies.

Jan. 20—Pakistan calls for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the worsening situation in Kashmir.

Jan. 24—In a letter to the Security Council, India accuses Pakistan of stirring up trouble over the Kashmir issue. She asks for direct negotiations between the two countries.

ALBANIA

Jan. 3—Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai completes his 4-day official visit.

ALGERIA

Jan. 7—Hundreds of unemployed fight Oran police in a riotous demonstration against the government of President Ahmed Ben Bella.

Jan. 14—Ministers and party leaders hold rallies in 14 cities seeking to arouse Algerians against "counter-revolutionaries."

Jan. 28—The trial of a young Algerian journalist accused of the murder of the First Foreign Minister begins.

BOLIVIA

Jan. 20—Vice President Juan Lechin Aguendo, head of the tin miners' union, indicates that he will run for president against President Victor Paz Estenssoro in June.

Jan. 28—After a bitter session, the National Revolutionary Movement, Bolivia's dominant party, renominates President Paz.

BRAZIL

Jan. 1—President Joao Goulart tells the nation that \$1.3 billion in debts will be due by the end of 1965 and that full payment cannot be made without seriously cutting into the rate of economic development.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE Canada

Jan. 14—Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson announces the appointment of Lionel Chevrier as High Commissioner in Great Britain.

Jan. 16—Following two days of talks with President de Gaulle in Paris, Pearson says Canada is interested in selling uranium to France.

Jan. 20—In the first major revision of his cabinet, Pearson makes nine changes. The most significant is the promotion of Guy Favreau, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, to be Minister of Justice.

Jan. 22—In Washington, Pearson and U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sign two agree-

ments. One provides for a multi-million dollar power and flood control development for the Columbia River Basin, and the other for an international park at the summer home of Franklin Roosevelt on Campobello Island, N.B.

Cyprus

Jan. 1—President (Archbishop) Makarios says he has decided to abrogate treaties with Britain, Greece and Turkey which guarantee the island's constitution and its territorial integrity.

Jan. 2—Greek and Turkish Cypriote leaders agree to attend an international conference in London in an attempt to restore peace.

Jan. 6—The government informs U.N. Secretary General U Thant that it accepts in principle the stationing of an U.N. observer in Cyprus to check on compliance with the cease-fire.

Jan. 10—Vice President Fazil Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish minority, charges that the Greek community is receiving arms of Communist manufacture from the United Arab Republic.

Jan. 15—Delegates from Turkey, Greece, the Greek and Turkish elements on Cyprus, and Great Britain open London talks.

Jan. 28—Protesting the lack of progress, Turkey announces its withdrawal from the London conference.

Jan. 31—The U.S. and Britain jointly propose an international force to keep order on Cyprus. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*, Jan. 31.)

Ghana

Jan. 2—President Kwame Nkrumah escapes the fifth attempt on his life since 1957.

Jan. 6—The government calls for a purge of all "reactionary" elements in the civil service, judiciary, police and army.

Jan. 11—Communist China's Premier, Chou En-lai, arrives in Accra.

Jan. 16—In a joint communiqué, Nkrumah and Chou En-lai call for an "anti-imperialist conference" of African, Asian and Latin American peoples.

Jan. 24—A nationwide referendum begins on

a government proposal making Ghana officially a one-party state and giving the President power to dismiss Supreme and High Court judges at his discretion.

Great Britain

(See also *Cyprus*.)

Jan. 7—Britain announces a multimillion dollar sale of 450 buses to Cuba. A five-year credit is extended to Cuba.

Jan. 14—Arriving in London for two days of talks with Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Hume, West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard says "a prosperous, happy and free Europe" can be achieved only if Britain is included.

Jan. 16—In a joint communiqué, Douglas-Hume and Erhard agree that the West must continue to seek relaxation of international tensions and work for East-West agreements.

Jan. 24—The British government tells U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy that it is prepared to go to war if necessary to uphold its commitments to Malaysia.

Jan. 26—It is reported that Britain has asked the U.S. to send troops to help maintain order on Cyprus.

British forces help quell army mutinies in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda.

After meeting with Robert Kennedy, Prime Minister Douglas-Hume announces Britain's approval of the Borneo cease-fire and the proposed Asian leaders' conference.

India

Jan. 6—India rejects a Pakistani protest charging what Pakistan has termed a move "to merge occupied Kashmir" with India.

Jan. 7—It is announced that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru has been seriously ill.

Jan. 9—A plenary session of the Indian Congress Party's 68th national convention opens without Mr. Nehru.

Jan. 11—Three days of rioting in Calcutta between Muslims and Hindus result in 60 deaths. The demonstrations follow reports that Muslims were killing Hindus in East Pakistan.

Nehru turns over to Gulzarilal Nanda, Minister of Home Affairs, and T. T. Krishnamachari, Minister of Finance, responsibility for running the government while he is sick.

Jan. 22—Lal Bahadur Shastri, a moderate often considered a potential successor to Nehru, joins the Cabinet as Minister Without Portfolio.

Jan. 26—Prime Minister Nehru makes his first public appearance, since suffering a stroke, at the annual Republic Day parade.

Kenya

Jan. 24—Native troops in Nairobi and Nakuru mutiny over pay. Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta asks Britain to send troops to help maintain order.

Jan. 25—Reports from Nairobi indicate that the army mutiny has been put down by British troops.

Malaysia, Federation of

(See also *Indonesia*.)

Jan. 20—Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia arrives in Kuala Lumpur. After conferring with him, Prime Minister Prince Abdul Rahman indicates he is willing to talk with Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal over the dispute between the new Federation of Malaysia and the Philippines.

U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy arrives to discuss the Indonesia-Malaysian dispute with government officials.

Pakistan

Jan. 6—The government declares Jamaat-i-Islami, the nation's most powerful orthodox Muslim political party, "an illegal organization." All its activities are banned and 17 leaders are jailed as subversive.

Jan. 14—The National Economic Council announces a five-year program of economic and social development to cost \$10.5 billion.

Jan. 17—It is revealed that savage religious riots between Muslims and Hindus have broken out in East Pakistan.

Jan. 24—Pakistan proposes to India a meeting of ministers to find a "permanent solution to the minority problems in both countries."

Tanganyika

Jan. 20—African troops in the capital of Dar es Salaam mutiny against their British officers.

Jan. 21—President Julius K. Nyerere condemns the mutiny as a "disgrace" and calls on the nation to remain calm.

Jan. 25—At the request of the government, British troops are flown in to quell mutinous soldiers.

Jan. 27—President Nyerere calls for a meeting of African states to discuss the "dangers" of the East African revolt.

Uganda

Jan. 7—Prime Minister Milton A. Obote says his country will restrict the growth of political parties and develop as a one-party Socialist state.

Jan. 23—Army troops mutiny over pay increases; at the request of the government, 400 British troops are flown in from Kenya to help maintain order.

Zanzibar

Jan. 12—Prime Minister Sheik Mohammed Shamte Hamadi and his predominantly Arab Cabinet are overthrown in a revolution apparently inspired by racial antagonism.

Jan. 14—Prime Minister Abdullah Kassim Hanga says his new revolutionary government has "no policy of friends and enemies."

Jan. 16—President Abeid Karume denounces the U.S. attitude toward the new regime. The American consul is temporarily arrested.

Jan. 19—Reports reaching the West indicate that Africans trained by the Soviet Union, Communist China and Cuba control the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Internal Affairs.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Northern Rhodesia

Jan. 1—The federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is dissolved.

Jan. 20—In the first general elections held in Northern Rhodesia, the United National Independence Party wins by a wide margin.

Jan. 22—Kenneth Kaunda is sworn in as the country's first Prime Minister.

CAMBODIA

Jan. 4—French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer arrives in Phnompenh to confer with Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Jan. 5—France offers Cambodia tanks, trucks and combat aircraft to help defend the kingdom's neutrality.

Jan. 14—Prince Sihanouk says he hopes the U.S. and Cambodia will soon be friends again and that mediation efforts by the Philippines will be successful.

CHINA, NATIONALIST

Jan. 22—Premier Yen Chia-kan urges French President Charles de Gaulle to reconsider his decision to recognize Communist China.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Jan. 26—A U.S. woman missionary is killed by terrorist insurgents in Kwilu Province. This follows 10 days of rebel action during which government sources say the rebels have gained one third of the Province.

CUBA

Jan. 10—The government announces an allegedly balanced 1964 budget of 2.3 billion pesos. The peso is officially listed as equal to \$1.

Jan. 11—Cuba buys \$11 million worth of buses from Britain.

Jan. 22—Concluding the visit of Premier Fidel Castro to Moscow, Cuba and the Soviet Union sign a long-term trade agreement calling for increased Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar. Castro agrees to support the limited test ban treaty.

FRANCE

- Jan. 15—Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson confers in Paris with President Charles de Gaulle on East-West relations and the Southeast Asia situation.
- Jan. 18—A parliamentary mission leaves for Peking to strengthen ties between Communist China and the de Gaulle government.
- Jan. 22—The government announces that in addition to visiting Mexico in March, de Gaulle will visit Brazil later in the year.
- Jan. 27—General de Gaulle announces that diplomatic relations have been established with the government of Communist China; this is the first recognition of Communist China by a major power since the Korean War.
- Jan. 28—France and the U.S.S.R. agree to negotiate a five-year trade agreement to increase French-Soviet trade.

France denies that recognition of Communist China implies a break in its relations with Nationalist China.

- Jan. 30—French officials deny that France participated in the plot to overthrow the ruling junta in South Vietnam. (See also *South Vietnam*.)
- Jan. 31—De Gaulle suggests that in cooperation with Communist China the former French possessions in Indochina—Laos, Cambodia and North and South Vietnam, should be neutralized under international guarantee.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

- Jan. 2—The government begins a program gradually ending state assistance for its oil industry. All tariffs on crude oil are eliminated, and progressively decreasing subsidies are granted domestic producers for the next 6 years.
- Jan. 7—Finance Minister Rolf Dohlgrüm, presenting the 1964 federal budget to Parliament, calls for an average income tax cut of 6 per cent to stimulate the economy.
- Jan. 13—Willy Brandt is nominated by the executive board of the German Social Democratic Party as the party's new chair-

man. They accept his condition that he retain his office as Mayor of West Berlin.

- Jan. 23—The government reports that in the first 11 months of 1963 West Germany had a foreign trade surplus of \$1.3 billion. Exports were slightly over \$13 billion, an increase of 8.5 per cent over 1962.
- Jan. 31—The Interior Ministry reveals that Ewald Peters, personal security chief for Ludwig Erhard, has been arrested for complicity in the war-time murder of Jews.

GERMANY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (East)

- Jan. 5—At midnight, the 17-day pass agreement that has allowed 1.25 million West Berliners to cross the border into East Berlin ends.
- Jan. 10—Communist leader Walter Ulbricht returns from a two-day "unofficial" visit to Moscow, where he conferred with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

GREECE

- Jan. 8—King Paul dismisses the three-month-old Parliament and schedules new elections for Feb. 16.
- Jan. 21—Queen Frederika arrives in the U.S. for a 17-day visit.

INDONESIA

- Jan. 7—President Sukarno arrives in Manila to confer with President Diosdado Macapagal.
- Jan. 8—Reports from Manila indicate that Sukarno has been unsuccessful in persuading the Philippines to join Indonesia in an economic boycott of Malaysia.
- Jan. 16—U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy arrives in Tokyo for talks with Sukarno.
- Jan. 17—Kennedy urges Sukarno to curb guerrilla raids into Sarawak and Sabah, the Malaysian areas bordering on Indonesian Borneo. He warns a major conflict may develop.
- Jan. 23—Kennedy and Sukarno confer at Jakarta. Indonesia agrees to a cease-fire with Malaysia. The foreign ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia

are to meet in Bangkok in February in an attempt to resolve their differences.

Sukarno vows continued hostility toward Malaysia in a speech in Jakarta.

IRAQ

Jan. 4—Vice President Major General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr is removed and the office of vice president is abolished under a decree issued by President Abdel Salam Arif. General al-Bakr was President of the Baathist government overthrown November 18 by President Arif.

ITALY

Jan. 3—The Socialist party suspends 12 Senators and 25 Deputies who have failed to support the new coalition government.

Jan. 11—The left wing of the Socialist party, representing about 40 per cent of the party's membership, announces it will form a new group, to be called the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity.

Jan. 27—West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard begins a state visit in Italy.

LAOS

Jan. 29—In Vientiane, the neutralist faction reports that Communist forces have launched a strong attack in southern Laos.

LIBYA

Jan. 22—King Idris I announces the resignation of Mohieddine Fekini as Prime Minister and the appointment of Mahmud Mun-tasser to replace him.

Jan. 25—It is revealed that since January 16 students have been demonstrating sporadically, apparently in favor of U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabism and against the conservatism of 75-year-old King Idris.

PANAMA

(See also *Int'l. O.A.S.* and *U.S. Foreign Policy.*)

Jan. 9—Hundreds of Panamanian students invade the Canal Zone, setting fire to U.S. buildings. The day-long rioting begins when U.S. students in the Canal Zone refuse to heed an agreement that the U.S.

and Panamanian flags fly side by side.

Jan. 10—Panama breaks off relations with the U.S. and denounces the treaties under which the U.S. operates the Panama Canal. The government accuses U.S. forces of "unjustifiable aggression" against Panamanians in rioting that leaves 20 dead.

The U.S. and Panama agree to let the Inter-American Peace Committee use its good offices to settle their dispute.

Jan. 15—President Roberto Chiari tells his nation that he has agreed to resume relations with the U.S. on the assumption that negotiations to be held next month will lead to revision of the Canal treaties.

Jan. 17—After U.S. President Johnson says he has not committed himself to treaty revision, Panama completes her break of diplomatic relations with the U.S.

Jan. 21—Panama's delegate to the O.A.S. leaves for Washington after being instructed "not to yield one step" in demanding a revised Canal treaty.

Jan. 28—Panama decides to discontinue negotiations with the U.S. and to seek action in the Council of the O.A.S.

PHILIPPINES, THE

(See *British Commonwealth, Malaysia and Indonesia.*)

PORTUGAL

Angola

Jan. 3—The Angolan government-in-exile, headed by Holden Roberto and based at Leopoldville, decides to accept the help of Communist China and "other Communist countries."

Jan. 7—The Foreign Minister of the Congo says that all assistance to the Angolan government-in-exile must be channeled through the Congo government.

RUMANIA

Jan. 4—The Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Ion Georghe Maurer, reveals that plans for economic growth this year call for an 11 per cent increase over last year.

Jan. 17—The deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission indicates that the

country will continue its policy of pursuing economic independence from the European Communist bloc.

SPAIN

Jan. 8—The U.S. Air Force announces plans to close one of its three bases in Spain and to bring 8,000 Americans home by July 1.

TUNISIA

Jan. 9—Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China arrives in Tunis.

Jan. 10—Tunisia recognizes the government of Communist China.

U.S.S.R., THE

Jan. 1—The Soviet Union sends a message to the world capitals proposing the renunciation of force in all territorial disputes.

Jan. 7—In a formal statement at the opening of negotiations for a two-year extension of a cultural exchange program with the U.S., the Soviet Union urges direct contacts between non-governmental organizations without U.S. State Department control.

Jan. 13—Cuban Premier Castro flies to Moscow for talks with Premier Khrushchev.

Jan. 15—The government announces postponement of a major power and aluminum project in Siberia to divert resources to the expansion of the chemical industry.

Jan. 21—The Soviet Union and Cuba conclude a trade agreement guaranteeing Cuba against "fluctuations of sugar prices in the world market and against economic sabotage by American monopolists."

Jan. 23—The Soviet Union reports there was a sharp drop in the rate of growth of consumer-goods production last year.

UNITED STATES, THE

Civil Rights

(See also *Segregation*.)

Jan. 11—Fourteen Atlanta, Georgia, hotels and motels publicly pledge to accept reservations regardless of race.

Economy, The

Jan. 17—The Labor Department reports that in December the average factory worker earned \$2.50 an hour, an all-time high.

Jan. 20—In his Economic Message to Congress, President Johnson reports that the gross national product in 1963 was \$585 billion. He predicts a 1964 gross national product of \$623 billion, a drop of 500,000 in the number of persons unemployed, and record profits if Congress enacts his economic programs.

Jan. 29—The Department of Labor reveals that the Consumer Price Index showed the largest price rise in five years for 1963.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Int'l, Disarmament and O.A.S.; British Commonwealth, Cyprus; Indonesia; and Panama*.)

Jan. 1—President Johnson announces he will nominate Edwin Martin, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to be Ambassador to Argentina.

Jan. 7—The Central Intelligence Agency reports that the Soviet Union's economic growth in the last two years has been less than 2.5 per cent annually, compared to the 5 per cent growth rate of the U.S.

Jan. 10—Johnson speaks by telephone with President Chiari of Panama, appealing to him to control Panamanian crowds and troops and promising in return to control U.S. citizens and troops in the Canal Zone.

Export licenses are issued for the sale of \$104 million worth of additional wheat to the Soviet Union.

The State Department reports that seven countries—Japan, West Germany, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark and France—have eased import restrictions on a number of U.S. agricultural and industrial products.

Jan. 13—Officials admit that the U. S. Embassy in Panama and other government agencies failed to inform Washington for two days that trouble was brewing over the flag issue in the Canal Zone.

Jan. 14—Attorney General Robert Kennedy leaves for a Far Eastern trip to confer with Indonesian President Sukarno.

Italian President Antonio Segni arrives in Washington for a 2-day state visit.

Returning from Panama, Army Secretary

Cyrus Vance says "Castro Communist" agents trained in Cuba are responsible for having increased Panamanian violence.

Jan. 15—The U.S. insists it has made no commitment to negotiate a new treaty regarding the Panama Canal; it retains the right to refuse to do so.

Jan. 16—Johnson proposes a \$115 million budget for the Peace Corps, compared to its appropriation of \$96 million this year.

Jan. 17—Panama completes her diplomatic break with the U.S. as O.A.S. mediation efforts collapse.

Jan. 21—Johnson's new budget calls for \$3.4 billion for foreign aid, the smallest request since the program was started in 1947.

Jan. 23—Appealing for renewed efforts to settle the Panama dispute, Johnson says the U.S. will engage in a "full and frank" review of all controversial issues.

Jan. 24—In London, Robert Kennedy expresses confidence in Indonesian President Sukarno's pledges of a Malaysian cease-fire.

Jan. 27—Greek Queen Frederika lunches with President and Mrs. Johnson at the White House.

Jan. 28—Robert Kennedy reports to the President on his Far Eastern trip.

Jan. 29—The U.S. charges that Soviet aircraft shot down an unarmed U.S. training plane in East Germany Jan. 28. Three U.S. officers were killed.

Jan. 31—The U.S. and Britain jointly propose an international force of some 10,000 troops in Cyprus; the minimum U.S. force would be 1,200 men plus necessary support troops.

It is reported from Washington that investigation shows the Russians do not bear primary responsibility for the downing of a trainer plane over East Germany Jan. 28. Both U.S. and Soviet aircraft tried to warn the plane straying 60 miles inside East Germany.

Government

Jan. 3—Esther Peterson, Assistant Secretary of Labor, is named special presidential assistant for consumer affairs.

Jan. 8—In his State of the Union Message,

President Johnson declares an administration-backed war on national poverty. He urges immediate enactment of a tax-reduction measure and a civil rights bill. (See pp. 176 ff. of this issue for text of the Message.)

Jan. 9—Roswell Gilpatric resigns as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance is named to replace him, and Stephen Ailes is appointed the new Army Secretary.

Jan. 11—The federal report on smoking is released. It finds that the use of cigarettes contributes so substantially to the American death rate that "appropriate remedial action" is called for.

Jan. 13—Senate investigators hear testimony that Robert Baker, former secretary to the Senate's Democratic majority, made a profit of "about \$4,000" in a joint land venture with Florida's Senator George Smathers.

Jan. 15—Theodore Sorensen resigns as Special Counsel to the President.

Jan. 21—Johnson sends Congress his \$97.9 billion budget for fiscal 1965. It calls for reduced military spending and for increased spending on education, health and manpower programs.

Edward R. Murrow resigns as director of the U.S. Information Agency. Carl T. Rowan, U.S. Ambassador to Finland, is named to replace him.

Testimony before the Senate Rules Committee in relation to the Robert Baker investigation reveals that in 1959 Lyndon Johnson, then Senator, accepted an expensive stereo phonograph set; Baker's role in the transaction is left in doubt.

Jan. 23—The Senate adopts a new rule requiring that at least three hours of debate each day be confined to the business at hand.

The anti-poll tax amendment becomes the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution as the South Dakota legislature ratifies the measure.

Jan. 24—A presidential Advisory Commission calls for major revision of narcotics laws.

Jan. 27—President Johnson delivers to Con-

gress his message on the role of the federal government in housing.

Jan. 28—The White House makes public the resignation of special assistant to the president Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.

Jan. 31—Johnson asks Congress for increased aid to U.S. farmers.

Labor

Jan. 8—In his State of the Union Message to Congress, Johnson proposes that the government be allowed to impose financial penalties on businesses that consistently work their employees overtime rather than hire additional help.

Jan. 20—In his annual economic message to Congress, Johnson says that two million jobs are eliminated each year by the increased productivity of U.S. workers and their equipment.

Military

Jan. 4—Johnson directs eligible men reaching the draft-registration age of 18 be given physical and mental tests. Those who fail will be allowed to enter new, voluntary rehabilitation programs.

Jan. 8—Johnson announces a major cutback in the production of nuclear materials used in the fabrication of atomic weapons.

Jan. 9—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara terms "completely misleading, politically irresponsible and damaging to the national security" Senator Barry Goldwater's charges that U.S. intercontinental missiles are unreliable.

Jan. 10—Senator Goldwater repeats his charge that ICBMs are unreliable and asks for a congressional investigation.

Jan. 15—Johnson submits to Congress a \$5.3 billion budget for the civilian space program.

Jan. 20—A U.S. Court of Appeals declares unconstitutional that section of the Selective Service Act dealing with deferment of conscientious objectors. The court holds that a conscientious objector does not have to prove that his refusal to serve is based on a belief in God.

Jan. 21—Johnson's 1964-1965 budget which he submits to Congress calls for defense

spending of \$52.1 billion, a reduction of \$1.1 billion over the current year. However, the budget calls for 50 new nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles having a range of 9000 miles.

Jan. 25—At Vandenburg Air Force Base, a balloon satellite, Echo 2, is lofted into orbit. The giant balloon is designed for collaborative experiments with the Soviet Union.

Jan. 27—McNamara says that "damage-limiting strategy" is the basis of U.S. military policy; it calls for military force adequate to destroy the Communist bloc.

Jan. 29—The heaviest space satellite in history with a cargo of some 20 thousand pounds is launched by the U.S.

Jan. 30—A Ranger spacecraft with 6 television cameras is launched on course to the moon; it is hoped that it will relay photographs before it crashes on the moon.

Politics

Jan. 3—Arizona's Senator Barry Goldwater announces he will seek the Republican presidential nomination. He also reveals he plans to seek renomination as Senator.

New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller invites Senator Goldwater to debate the basic issues of the campaign in New Hampshire.

Jan. 4—Goldwater says he sees no sense in face-to-face debates with Rockefeller.

Jan. 7—Michigan's Governor George Romney says he is not actively seeking the Republican presidential nomination but will not turn away from the opportunity if it is presented to him.

Jan. 9—Goldwater charges in his New Hampshire primary campaigning that the nation's long-range missiles "are not dependable" and urges increased reliance on manned bombers.

(See also *U.S. Military*)

Jan. 16—Delegates pledged to Henry Cabot Lodge are entered in the New Hampshire Republican primary race.

Jan. 17—Astronaut Lieutenant Colonel John Glenn announces he will seek the Democratic Ohio senatorial nomination.

Jan. 20—Harold Stassen says he plans to enter

the presidential primaries in New Hampshire, California and the District of Columbia.

Jan. 23—Richard Nixon says he would accept a draft for the Republican presidential nomination.

Jan. 27—Maine's Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith says she will enter the New Hampshire primaries as a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination.

Jan. 29—Former President Eisenhower asks for tolerance of government officials who accept gifts while in office; he also disagrees with Goldwater's charge that American ICBMs are unreliable.

Segregation

Jan. 26—Seventy Negroes are jailed after demonstrations in Atlanta, Georgia; in subsequent clashes six persons are injured.

Jan. 27—More than 150 demonstrators are arrested in Atlanta.

Jan. 29—As some 100 pickets demonstrate for full racial integration in Cleveland, Ohio, elementary schools, violence breaks out.

The New York City Board of Education makes public its 3-year plan to improve racial balance in some 30 of the city's 165 predominantly Negro and Puerto Rican schools; civil rights leaders continue plans for a city-wide boycott of the schools February 3.

Supreme Court

Jan. 13—In a unanimous decision the Court strikes down a Louisiana law requiring that the race of a political candidate be printed on the ballot.

VATICAN, THE

Jan. 4—Pope Paul VI, beginning his pilgrimage to the Holy Land, arrives in Jerusalem.

Jan. 5—Pope Paul and Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras of the Eastern Orthodox Church confer in Jerusalem.

Pope Paul meets with President Zalman Shazar of Israel; both men join in an appeal for peace among all men.

Jan. 6—Pope Paul and Patriarch Athenagoras, with Cardinals, Bishops and Metro-

politans, pray atop the Mount of Olives that Christian unity may soon be achieved.

The Pope arrives in Rome at the conclusion of his precedent-shattering three-day pilgrimage.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Jan. 1—President Johnson bolsters the internal position of the ruling military junta with a renewed pledge of U.S. support.

Jan. 2—The Council of Notables, a newly formed high-level civilian advisory body, holds its first meeting. Major General Duong Van Minh tells the group the country cannot now afford to slide into partisan political bickering.

Jan. 6—A major power realignment places the country under the rule of three generals. The triumvirate consists of Major General Minh, Major General Tran Van Don and Major General Le Van Kim.

Jan. 9—The U.S. agrees to ship \$31.2 million worth of surplus commodities to Vietnam during 1964.

Jan. 14—A joint U.S.-Vietnamese report warns that the war in the Mekong delta "cannot ever be won" unless real reforms are carried out at the village level.

Jan. 22—The Council of Notables calls on the government to suspend diplomatic relations with France after hearing details of the French proposal for ending the war.

Jan. 25—The government formally rejects France's nomination of a new Ambassador to Saigon.

Jan. 28—The Government announces that 2,418 political prisoners have been released as an amnesty for the New Year.

Jan. 30—Major General Nguyen Khanh, commander of the Army's I Corps, leads a bloodless coup against the ruling junta and proclaims himself chief of state, replacing Major General Duong Van Minh, who is under arrest. Khanh tells U.S. officials that he acted to counter a threatened French plot to neutralize Vietnam. (See also *France*.)

Jan. 31—General Khanh reveals that Duong Van Minh has agreed to serve as an advisor for the new government.

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